

Excerpt D. The Look of a Feeling: The Importance of Post/Structuralism

Part I. Overview and Summary to Date

This Excerpt is the fourth in a series of excerpts from the first draft of volume 2 of the Kosmos trilogy, *Kosmic Karma and Creativity* (whose first volume was *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*). Those responding to the call to have the word “sex” appear in the title have voted for *Sex, Karma, and Creativity* (whaddya think?).

Because much of this material represents a radical departure from any known form of philosophy, psychology, or spirituality (ancient or modern), I will continue to offer summaries and overviews along with the excerpts themselves. Part I of this excerpt is such a summary, which is divided into “post-metaphysics” and “event horizons.” If you are familiar with the material, please feel free to skim or skip it; Part II begins the excerpt proper.

Integral Post-Metaphysics

In Excerpt A, “An Integral Age at the Leading Edge,” we saw evidence for the fact that, at this time, less than 2% of the adult population is at any stage, wave, or state of consciousness that could be called “integral.” However, the same evidence suggests that percentage is significantly increasing and may in fact reach 10% or more within a decade. Since much of that increase is concentrated in academia, the percentage of cultural thought leaders who are poised for integral consciousness may reach 20% or more. If so, this would constitute a profound shift in the capacity for integral thinking, feeling, and perception, which could be expected to have extensive social and cultural reverberations. We called this “An Integral Age at the Leading Edge.”

Accordingly, we might expect a significant increase in the demand for Integral models of virtually everything (integral psychology, integral art and literary theory, integral business, integral medicine, integral ecology, etc.). One such Integral model is **AQAL** (short for “all quadrants, all levels, all lines, all states, all types”), which is founded on a social practice of **integral methodological pluralism** (IMP), both of which are the focus of these Excerpts.

In Excerpt B, “The Many Ways We Touch,” we saw that any integral metatheory might best be guided by three heuristic principles: nonexclusion, enactment, enfoldment.

Nonexclusion means that “Everybody is right”—or more technically, that the experiences brought forth by one paradigm cannot legitimately be used to criticize, negate, or exclude the experiences brought forth by other paradigms. The reason that “everybody is right” is called **enactment**, which means that no experience is innocent and pregiven, but rather is brought forth or enacted in part by the activity of the subject doing the experiencing. Thus, one activity (or paradigm) will bring forth a particular set of experiences—experiences that are not themselves innocent reflections of the one, true, real, and pregiven world, but rather are co-created and co-enacted by the paradigm or activity itself, and, accordingly, one paradigm does not give “the correct view” of the world and therefore it cannot be used (as if it did) in order to negate, criticize, or exclude other experiences brought forth by other paradigms.

However, if one practice or paradigm includes the essentials of another and then adds further practices—such that it “enfolds” or includes the other—then that paradigm can legitimately be claimed to be more integral, which is the **enfoldment** principle. Together, these guiding principles give us an Integral Methodological Pluralism that is the warrant for AQAL metatheory.

In Excerpt C, we focused the urgent necessity to create an **Integral Post-Metaphysics**, which possesses the explanatory power of the great metaphysical systems but without their ontological baggage (which cannot be sustained in modern and postmodern

awareness—not philosophically, not critically, not phenomenologically, not scientifically). Instead of attacking the paucity of the modern and postmodern worldviews—which is the standard move by spiritual and new-paradigm advocates—it is perhaps more adept to reformulate and reconstruct the premodern interpretations of Spirit in light of modern and postmodern developments, such that the enduring fundamentals of the premodern, modern, and postmodern forms of Spirit’s own display can all be honored by trimming their absolutisms and acknowledging their true but partial natures (which is surely what Spirit does as it moves through its own manifestations in the premodern, modern, and postmodern world: just who did you think was authoring all that?).

Although the premodern experiences of Spirit—by the great shamans, saints, and sages—were as authentic as authentic can get, the *interpretations* they gave those experiences were of necessity clothed in the fabric of their own time. And that fabric, in light of Spirit’s own subsequent displays, is now a bit worn and threadbare. The premodern interpretative frameworks all tended to be to be mythic, metaphysical, substance-oriented, and postulated a pantheon of *pre-existing ontological structures* (whether in the form of a Great Chain of Being or the form of a Great Web of Life)—which, ironically, is an interpretive framework that amounted to a type of higher, spiritual, transpersonal *myth of the given*—exactly the epistemology so effectively deconstructed by postmodernism—so that the typical new-paradigm approaches exalting such frameworks are actually advancing an epistemological prejudice no longer capable of generating respect.

But my whole point is that you don’t need those metaphysical interpretations anyway (whether of a Great Chain or a pre-existing Great Web). By creating an Integral Post-Metaphysics, we can let the modern and postmodern world judge the merits of a spiritually integrative approach without their recoiling in ridicule at the package—the metaphysical package—in which the gift arrives. Same gift (the Great Perfection), but a different package (which is Spirit’s own skin today).

One of the first and most important suggested changes in the development of postmetaphysics is that the idea of *perception* be replaced by *perspective*. The great wisdom traditions and philosopher-sages (from Plotinus to Shankara to Gautama Buddha to Hegel to Aurobindo to Whitehead) built much of their interpretive frameworks with the concept of perception (as awareness/consciousness): the nature of this moment perceives, grasps, or prehends various phenomena; these *perceptions* or moments of bare attention are the “building blocks” of a sentient, panpsychic world; the resultant network of perceptions is an Indra’s Net of mutually perceiving and interdependent relationships. The power, beauty, and goodness of those great metaphysical systems are, I believe, undeniable.

But there are no perceptions anywhere in the real world; there are only perspectives. A subject perceiving an object is *always already* in a relationship of first-person, second-person, and third-person when it comes to the perceived occasions. If the manifest world is indeed panpsychic—or built of sentient beings (all the way up, all the way down)—then the manifest world is built of perspectives, not perceptions. Moving from perceptions to perspectives is the first radical step in the move from metaphysics to post-metaphysics. Subjects don’tprehend objects anywhere in the universe; rather, first persons prehend second persons or third persons: perceptions are always within actual perspectives. “Subject perceiving object” (or “bare attention to dharmas”) is not a raw given but a low-order abstraction that already tears the fabric of the Kosmos in ways that cannot easily be repaired.

(“First person” perspective means the perspective of the person speaking—I, singular, or we, plural. “Second person” means the person spoken to—you or thou. “Third person” means the person or thing spoken of—he, she, they, them, it, its. More generally, first person is any holon with agency or intentionality; second person is any holon to whom agency is directed; third person is any holon referred to. We will see examples of these perspectives as we proceed.)

Even if we say, with the materialist, that the world is composed of nothing but physical atoms, nonetheless “atom” is *already* a third-person symbol being perceived by a

first-person sentient being. And if we try to picture an actual atom, that too is a third-person entity prehended by a first person. In other words, even “atom” is not an entity, or even a perception, but a perspective, within which a perception occurs (i.e., all perceptions and feelings are always already within the space of an actual perspective). But surely, the critic would say, we can still imagine a time that there were only atoms, not humans, and therefore atoms existed without arising in a human perspective. (That again is still a third-person image held by a first-person awareness; but let’s imagine that we can imagine a time without human perspectives.) It is true there was a time before humans emerged. But if the world is actually panpsychic, then each atom had a rudimentary awareness or proto-experience of other atoms, and hence a first atom aware of a second atom is already and actually a first person in touch with a second person. In other words, these perspectives are indigenous to all sentient beings; if sentient beings go all the way down, so do perspectives. Thus, sentient beings and perspectives, not consciousness and phenomena, are the “stuff” of the Kosmos.

A perception, as we were saying, is not really an experience but an abstraction, and this is one of the reasons that the old metaphysical systems fall apart when scrutinized. Perception secretly privileges abstract objects; perspective privileges sentient beings.

In short, a world containing sentient beings is a world composed of perspectives—not feelings, not consciousness, not awareness, not processes, not events—for all of those are perspectives before they are anything else. The panpsychic approaches are headed in the right direction but stop short of the embodied mark. As just noted, if an atom actually has proto-experience, prehension, or rudimentary feeling, and it registers another atom, then the first atom is not a first atom but a first person, and the second atom is not a second atom but a second person; and they do not stand in the relation of subject prehending object but of first person feeling second person (“person,” of course, does not mean self-reflective awareness, but simple sentience or proto-sentience.) “Feeling” by itself is an abstraction away from what is actually happening, which is that two sentient occasions always stand *in relationships* such as first-person, second-person, and third-person to each other, and thus every first

person's feeling is actually a feeling of a second or third person, who in turn are first person to that sentient occasion, and so on.

(Think of something—a tree, for example. You are a sentient holon, the tree is a sentient holon, although you are not communing with it at the moment, and thus you are a first person holding the image of a third person. If you believe there is a level of organic vitality that you and the tree have in common, then you are a first person holding the image of a second person. Likewise, if the tree has any sentience at all, then if you actually approach it, it is a first person registering your second person existence. And so on. If all holons are sentient beings, then all perceptions are actually embedded in perspectives of, from, and between sentient beings, simplified as first-person, second-person, and third-person perspectives. Whenever the agency or intentionality of any holon—cell to ant to ape—is directed anywhere—and it is always directed somewhere—it is directed toward or within a world of other sentient holons, and this is why, if one atom bumps into another atom, then, from the point of view of that atom, a first person just encountered a second person, who in turn responded as first person to the second person of the first; if they influence each other in any way, that is a type of communication, and that communication is not merely a dynamic web but a third person, and so on. If the Kosmos contains sentient beings all the way down, then the Kosmos is composed not of feelings nor perceptions but perspectives, all the way down.)¹

On the other hand, if we do try to say that the world is composed of feelings, or awareness, or prehension, or dynamic webs of mutual interaction, or consciousness, dharmas, things, events, processes, and so on—as if those existed apart from the relations of sentient beings—then that is already a series of low-order abstractions that violate the richness of indigenous perspectives and, having abstracted away from their embodied being, flatten the Kosmos into the cosmos, a pervasive series of low-order abstractions which are then subconsciously mistaken for pregiven realities.

(Even the postmodernists are caught in this prior low-order abstraction that hands them a violated cosmos that they then attempt to repair with an emphasis on pluralism and interpretation, which only further hides, and exacerbates, the prior problem. Postmodernism emphasizes that perceptions are always interpreted, but both perceptions and interpretations are actually perspectives before any of that happens. Postmodernism has caught only a glimmer of a much deeper secret. That is, even postmodernism is caught in low-order metaphysics, a metaphysics that it has otherwise labored nobly to move beyond, as we saw in Excerpt C. The “crime” of metaphysics is not that it postulates non-material levels of reality, which may or may not exist, but that it postulates levels that are not always already perspectives, and thus are abstract in all the wrong ways.)

But whether metaphysics appears in its premodern, modern, or postmodern forms, its old ontological baggage—which was actually created by the secretly abstract, unreal, and metaphysical nature of “feeling” or “perception” acting as its building blocks—is almost certainly destined to go the way of phlogiston (or the “substance” that, to the medieval mind, carried fire). Fire is real, Spirit is real, but those interpretive frameworks are simply not necessary.

And so we begin again: the first quark is not a first particle but a first person, the second quark is a second person, their communication is a third person, and so on. We build a Kosmos out of sentient beings and their perspectives, not out of subjects and objects, not out of feeler and feelings, not bare attention and dharmas, not consciousness and phenomena, not events and processes, none of which exist in themselves, which is to say, none of them actually exist.

Sentient holons and their perspectives: so fundamental are some of these indigenous perspectives that by the time human sentient holons evolved, they were embedded in major natural languages as variants on first-, second-, and third-person perspectives, languages which themselves evolved over the years and inherently embodied and expressed these native dispositions. Some of these native perspectives are schematically represented in figure 1.




Figure 1. 8 Major Native Perspectives

In human languages, these perspectives are often embedded as pronouns, such as I, you, we, her, me, they, it, he, them, their, our, us, she, him: all the rich variety of perspectives that sentient beings possess by virtue of existing only in a world of other sentient beings. Figure 1 represents four of the most basic perspectives of being-in-the-world (I, we, it, and its), which we call the **four quadrants**, along with an inside and outside in each of the quadrants (which we will explain in a moment), giving us 8 major native perspectives of being-in-the-world. These are by no means the only major perspectives, just some worth highlighting.

When humans take up various modes of inquiry, they disclose, highlight, bring forth, illumine, and express the various types of phenomena enacted by-and-from various perspectives. In these excerpts, we are focusing on 8 of the major indigenous perspectives and

the methodologies they support. Of course, by the time we get to humans, these 8 indigenous stances of being-in-the-world begin to complexify enormously. But the litmus test of any integral post-metaphysics is whether these indigenous perspectives can and do generate the well-known modes of inquiry that have *already* been adopted by human beings. The answer, I believe, is yes. These methodologies are suggested in figure 2, showing these 8 indigenous perspectives and 8 of the major methodologies or paradigms they have engendered. (A Kuhnian “paradigm,” of course, is not a theory but a praxis, exemplar, injunction, or methodology, and here is used in that correct sense.)




Figure 2. 8 Major Paradigms or Methodologies

The point is simple: in order to *deny* the legitimacy any of those methodologies, you have to violate their native perspectives and the sentient beings holding them. Integral Methodological Pluralism refuses such violence. Rather—following the integrative guidelines of nonexclusion, enactment, and enfoldment—Integral Methodological Pluralism attempts to construct a framework, after the fact, of that which sentient beings are already doing anyway, with the hope that such a framework, in making room for what the Kosmos already allows, will help us find our way more generously in such a roomy world.

Some Major Event Horizons or Zones

There are (at least) 4 major perspectives of being-in-the-world, which we are calling the four quadrants—I, we, it, its—each of which can be looked at from *its own* inside or outside, giving us 8 primordial or indigenous perspectives available to sentient beings (see fig. 1). Each of those perspectives has an inherent methodology or mode of inquiry, or ways that sentient beings touch other sentient beings (see fig. 2).

These 8 native or primordial perspectives are the inside and outside of interiors and exteriors in singular and plural—a bit of a mouthful that nonetheless simply means that we can look at the inside and the outside of an “I,” a “we,” an “it,” and an “its.” In Excerpt C, we looked at the inside of an “I” and the inside of a “we”; in this excerpt we will be looking at the *outside* of an “I” and the *outside* of a “we” (and in the next excerpts, the insides and outsides of an “it” and an “its”).




Figure 3. 4 Major Zones

Each of those 8 views is in effect an “event horizon,” or a phenomenological world enacted and brought forth within that perspective. We called these **event horizons**, or **horizons**, or simply **zones**. All 8 perspectives engender phenomenological zones or event horizons, but we will be looking at four of the most important, which are numbered in figure 3. These four zones are not the same as the four quadrants, but simply represent another useful way to group the 8 indigenous perspectives (namely, the inside and outside of interiors and exteriors). These zones are as follows (which are stated in abstract form and thus can be mind-numbingly boring; succeeding examples will be more friendly, I trust, but the following gives the technical details for reference):

Zone #1: *interior* holons (an “I” or “we”) looked at from *inside* their own boundaries. This means a first-person approach to first-person realities (1p x 1p), in both singular and plural forms. The singular form is the **inside of an “I”** (classic paradigms or injunctions that bring forth, enact, and disclose these first-person singular dimensions of being-in-the-world include phenomenology, introspection, meditation). The plural form is the **inside of a “we”** (which can be brought forth, enacted, and disclosed with methodologies such as hermeneutics, collaborative inquiry, participatory epistemology).

Zone #2: *interior* holons (an “I” or “we”) looked at from *outside* their own boundaries. This means a third-person approach to first-person realities (3p x 1p), in both singular and plural forms. The singular form is the **outside of an “I”** (which can be approached with methodologies such as developmental structuralism). The plural form is the **outside of a “we”** (which can be approached with methodologies such as cultural anthropology, neostructuralism, archaeology, genealogy).

Zone #3: *exterior* holons (an “it” or “its”) looked at from *inside* their own boundaries. This means a first-person approach to third-person realities (1p x 3p), in both singular and plural forms.² The singular form is the **inside of an “it”** (which can be approached with methodologies such as biological phenomenology and autopoiesis). The plural form is the **inside of an “its”** (which can be approached with methodologies such as social autopoiesis).

Zone #4: *exterior* holons (an “it” or “its”) looked at from *outside* their own boundaries. This means a third-person approach to third-person realities (3p x 3p), in both singular and plural forms. The singular form is the **outside of an “it”** (which can be approached with methodologies such as behaviorism, positivism, empiricism). The plural form is the **outside of a “its”** (which can be approached with methodologies such as systems theory, component systems theory, chaos and complexity theory).

Excerpt C dealt with zone #1; this Excerpt focuses on zone #2. The next two excerpts focus on zones #3 and #4.

What, then, is zone #2, and what is the “outside of an interior” reality? And why do we call that *the look of a feeling*?

Part II. Entering ZONE #2: The Outsides of the Interior

Introduction

Start by recalling that zone #1, or the interior seen from within, is a first-person experience of a first-person reality, whether singular (I) or plural (we)—the inside of an “I” or “we.” In figure 1, this means anything seen from inside or within the boundaries of a holon in the Upper-Left and Lower-Left quadrants. In figure 2, the major methodologies enacting these zones are given as interior phenomenology and hermeneutics, respectively.

Zone #2 is simply those same holons seen from the outside (or seen from without)—hence, “the outsides of the interior.” Of course, all of these Left-Hand holons are interior realities, so you cannot see their insides or outsides in the exterior, sensorimotor world. You cannot see an “I” or “we” out there, running around in the empirical world. And yet we do indeed know *by acquaintance* what an “I” is, what a “we” is, and we know well enough where their boundaries are—which is why there are so many significant paradigms that enact and access them (from phenomenology to meditation to hermeneutics).

“Interior” classically means first-person, and “outside” classically means third-person. Thus, zone #2, or an “outside-view of the interior,” means *a third-person approach to first-person realities*.

Because third-person approaches are often a type of “looking” or “distancing” knowledge (e.g., “he sees the tree”), and because first-person approaches are often a type of

“feeling” or “touching” knowledge (e.g., “I touch the tree”), then zone #2 involves what might also be called “the look of a feeling.”

This “outside” look at “interior” realities happens all the time; for example, whenever I try to take a more objective look at myself; or when I attempt to see myself as others see me; or perhaps evaluate our own friendship. We will see many examples of this outside look at interior realities in a moment. But notice the crucial point: the “outside” (or third-person) component and the “interior” (or first-person) component are both very important: these approaches are indeed “outside” or “objectifying” or “third-person” approaches, but they are approaches *to an interior*, and that clearly implies that, somewhere down the line, those interiors can be known by acquaintance—i.e., they can themselves be seen or accessed (with, for example, any of the methodologies in zone #1). In other words, I cannot really do a third-person study of first-person realities unless I myself have some sort of access to those first-person realities. I can look at a feeling in an objective fashion, but only if I can actually locate that feeling to begin with.

That is the distinctive hallmark of all zone #2 paradigms: they are third-person approaches to realities that I have some sort of access to in first-person modes. As we will see, this is quite different from third-person approaches to holons *only as third persons*—which is typical of most forms of systems theory, for example, and which involves a type of third-person approach to third-person realities (“**3p x 3p**”).

Zone #2, on the other hand, is “**3p x 1p**”: a third-person of first-person—an objective or descriptive approach to realities that I know (or can know) by acquaintance. Zone #2 is a wonderfully important event horizon because, in an AQAL matrix of indigenous perspectives, this zone highlights, enacts, and brings forth those occasions that help me to reconstruct the interiors of another sentient being so that yet further forms of mutual understanding and compassionate embrace can stand forth in a Kosmos of radiant regard.

The Look of a Feeling

What is an example of a third-person approach to a first-person reality? What exactly is the look of a feeling?

The simplest is: I can take a third-person stance to my own interiors—I can look at my own feelings. I can try to be more objective about myself, try to see myself as others see me, try to get a little distance from myself and see myself more clearly. As I begin to move away from my own immediate sensations, I can start to interpret, describe, or conceptualize that experience. I stay close to my own felt prehensions, but I begin to describe and conceptualize them in a type of “interior objectivity.” In other words, I can take up a type of third-person or objective stance to my own interiors, apprehending them according to various concepts, theories, maps, or other schema—or even trying to see them as others might see them—thus taking an outside stance but still within my own interior horizon.³

These interiorly perceived images, sensations, and phenomena are often called “inner objects,” or more correctly “interior objects,” though we will use both phrases. When I directly feel or perceive these inner objects, that is a type of phenomenology or first-person perspective; when I attempt to see them as others might see them, that is more on the third-person side of the street. That is one version of the *outsides* of the *interiors*, a type of third-person (or objective) approach to first-person (or subjective) realities. It is seeing an interior holon from without, or from the outside of its boundaries, which is what happens when I approach it as an object of my subject. (Notice, however, that they are not merely subjects and objects, but first persons and third persons.)⁴

If that’s an example of the outsides of my own interiors, what about the outsides of *your* interiors? And how do I access those?

It happens all the time in communication. As you and I talk, we are exchanging words, symbols, signs, and tokens of our interiors in an attempt to understand each other. Those words are, in part, outside tokens of our interior states. That is, two subjects come together and, in addition to any harmonic empathy (and other forms of prior

intersubjectivity or tele-prehension), they attempt to *exchange tokens of their interiors* in order to more accurately understand each other. (These tokens, symbols, or signs are not merely or even especially linguistic, and certainly not at pre- and trans-linguistic waves in sentient beings. But linguistic exchange is perhaps the best understood form of this mode, and thus the one I will focus on in the following.)

As we saw in Excerpt C, communicative action of this sort involves the conversion of a third-person “him” or “her” or “it” (i.e., the one who is being *spoken about*) into a second-person “you” or “thou” (i.e., the one *to whom I am speaking*), and if I am now speaking with you, the implication is that we are speaking to each other and therefore we similarly-enough understand each other. That is, any *actual* “you” (or second person) implies a background of “we” (or first-person plural).

Notice, then, the difference between a second person and a third person. A second person is implicitly somebody who shares at least some sort of culture with me. If you and I have no comprehension of each other, if we are totally alien to each other, then we are actually third persons to each other—there is no way we are talking, communicating, or resonating with each other: you are not a “you” but a “he” or even an “it.” On the other hand, if you and I are adequately communicating or resonating at all, then your “I” and my “I” intersect in the nexus of a “we.” You and I are inside a we, which means our exchanges are internal to the nexus-agency of that we, and thus you and I are members of an interior compound network or culture. In short, any actual “you” exists only inside a circle of some sort of “we” (and any actual exchanges with an actual you are internal to the nexus-agency of that we).

(This, again, is why I often refer to second person not simply as “you,” but as “you/we” or “thou/we.” A you that is not part of a we is actually a him or an it. Therefore I often summarize first, second, and third persons as “I, we, and it,” since that more accurately captures the types of solidarity present in each relationship. This is not in any way to ignore second person, only set it in a context.)

If you and I are talking, one of things that we are doing is exchanging tokens, symbols, or signs (all of which are third-person “its” and artifacts) in order to help us understand each other. At first I might not understand what you are saying, but as we continue to dialogue, your meaning becomes clearer and clearer. You are presenting *outside* or *objective* tokens of your *interior* state in order that I can *reconstruct* your interior state in a similar-enough fashion that I will say, “I understand what you mean.” In this specific instance, I am not using tele-prehension or harmonic resonance in order to know you; I am rather reconstructing what your interior seems to be like based on communicative exchange. The result, if successful, is that with regard to the particular item you are trying to convey, you and I have phenomenologically created or enacted a **we-space** of mutual understanding around that item—or a shared event horizon within which that item enactively arises. (This “we” or first-person plural space is, put simply, the miracle of all miracles.)

Now, what if I wanted to study or investigate that we-space (or that cultural nexus)? How can I get at the realities of any “we”? Among other things, I can look at them from within their own immediate boundaries, or from without—I can approach them from the inside or from the outside *of the we-boundary itself*. The view from the inside of the “we” is, of course, hermeneutics. And, although there are many different approaches to looking at a “we” from the outside, one of the most classic and influential is simply **structuralism**.

(In fig. 2, “structuralism” is listed for the outside of the individual interior, and “cultural anthropology” for the outside of collective interiors. Structuralism can be, and is, used in both, but the complexities of collective holons render structuralism simply one of the many useful tools in cultural anthropology, whereas for the outsides of individual interiors over time, it has no viable competitors and thus is listed as the exemplar of zone #2 in first-person singular. We will be exploring both.)

Structuralism is the study of the *behavior* of an *interior* holon. (The interior holon can be singular or plural, individual or cultural, I or we). It is indeed the study of interior realities, but a study that watches their behavior as seen from some sort of an outside stance.

We have already seen that, for example, I can take up a third-person stance to my own interiors, and that is the start of structuralism. It is an “objective” or third-person view of a first-person holon, but it then goes an extra step and attempts to offer a reconstructive account of the pattern or agency of that holon’s interior.⁵ That is, it attempts to discover, describe, or elucidate what we have called the “internality codes” of a holon, or the rules and patterns that the subholons internal to that holon are following; in this case, the internality codes of an interior (I or we) holon. We used the example of a game of chess to show what some of these rules or patterns are like—you and I are in a chess game when our interactions are internal to the rules of the game (i.e., when our moves follow the game’s rules, internality code, or structure).

That interior pattern (manifested in outside-exterior behavior and reconstructed from the regularities of that behavior) is called the interior holon’s **structure**, which means the *regularities* governing the elements that are *internal* to that interior structure (either internal to the individual agency of an “I” or internal to the nexus-agency of a “we”). Those regularities or structures represent the **Kosmic habits** that are the fundamental modes of that holon’s enduring existence in AQAL spacetime. The game of chess was a simple example of the rules governing a “we” or a nexus-agency; structuralism is simply the attempt to discover those rules. Let’s see exactly what that means.

Representative Methodology of Zone #2: Adequate Structuralism

We can continue to use the game of chess to highlight some of the central issues. Let us start by noticing that a phenomenologist, a structuralist, a hermeneuticist, and a systems theorist will all approach this chess game in very different ways, each of them accessing some important dimensions of that social occasion.

A phenomenologist will attempt to bracket all assumptions and simply describe the phenomena as carefully as possible. The players, the chess board, the 16 tokens, all will be phenomenologically highlighted and described in their immediateness. “To the things

themselves!” is how it is often put, and there is much merit in that injunction. But there is a curious thing about chess: the rules that the 16 chess pieces or phenomena are following cannot be found anywhere on the things themselves, they cannot be found phenomenologically. The rules of chess are not written on any of the chess pieces, nor are they written on the chess board; nor can they be found by looking carefully and extensively at the faces of the players. In fact, the essence of chess is invisible to typical phenomenology.

As Foucault so elaborately documented, this is why structuralism caused such an enormous sensation when it was first introduced, and why it quickly supplanted phenomenology (especially in its Husserlian forms) and hermeneutics (especially in its Heideggerian forms). Why? Because structuralism is designed precisely to get at the rules of chess, which cannot be easily discerned with any of those other methodologies. Structuralism, as a social practice or paradigm, highlights those dimensions and perspectives of holons that involve the patterns, rules, or regularities—the Kosmic habits—that they display. Done correctly, structuralism does not impose these rules but discloses them. People are already playing chess; structuralism looks for the rules and regularities of what people are already doing.

These patterns and regularities cannot be spotted by phenomenology, hermeneutics, or systems theory, which becomes particularly obvious when we look at complex social interactions, such as those embodied in language, because part of their existence involves indigenous perspectives not activated by those other inquiries. This is why Foucault said, with reference to phenomenology, “So the problem of language appeared and it was clear that phenomenology was no match for structural analysis in accounting for the effects of meaning that could be produced by a structure of the linguistic type. And quite naturally, with the phenomenological spouse finding herself disqualified by her inability to address language, structuralism became the new bride.” (And Foucault himself was one of the brilliant pioneers at that wedding.)

How does structuralism do this? How does it disclose these otherwise hidden regularities? Basically, structuralism is phenomenology plus history. That is, it starts with phenomenology (and hermeneutics)—or any first-person interior realities—but then follows the phenomena over long periods of time and attempts to spot any regularities or patterns that the phenomena follow. Those patterns are, of course, the “structures” within which the phenomena move. In this case, all 16 chess phenomena follow specific rules that are written nowhere on the chess pieces themselves, but can be clearly discerned if you watch the chess moves *over time*.

If the phenomenologist attempts to describe the present phenomena or tokens as clearly as possible (in an immediate prehension and descriptive laying bare), the hermeneuticist attempts to know the players themselves, up close and personal, through mutual dialogue and shared meaning horizons. The structuralist goes one step further and attempts to discern the hidden, invisible, regulatory patterns that the players and the tokens might be following over time. In this case, the rules of chess.

When the inquiry known as structuralism is being adequately engaged according to *the guidelines of its own paradigms*—deciding which, we temporarily bracket critics who are not so engaged, for they violate the nonexclusion principle—then the structuralist will summarize the behavioral responses representing the exteriors of intentionality with a set of “structures,” which represent the internality codes of the interior holons being engaged. Every holon or stable entity (whether an I, we, it, or its) has some sort of identity or agency—every whole has some sort of **wholeness**, some sort of coherence, and *structuralists attempt to identify the nature of that wholeness in the interior domains*.

Here are a few of the types of holistic structures that have been suggested (and for which there is significant evidence): Carol Gilligan’s three stages of selfish, care, and universal care in female moral development; Robert Kegan’s five orders of consciousness; Spiral Dynamics’ elucidation of the blue meme, orange meme, green meme, turquoise meme, etc.; Jean Gebser’s famous archaic, magic, mythic, rational, and integral structures; Jane

Loevinger's symbiotic, conformist, conscientious, individualistic, and integral self-identities (etc.); formal operational cognition, the relativistic-pluralistic value structure, the construct-aware self, fourth-order consciousness, moral-stage 2, the participatory stage, preconventional stage, the conscientious self, sensorimotor cognition, self-actualization needs, and so on.

All of those are postulated structures that attempt to account for known Kosmic habits of interior domains. Those structures are themselves coherent wholes that help to enact and bring forth a world that is a co-creation of those structures doing the perceiving, knowing, and feeling. That structures co-create, present, and enact worlds, and do not merely perceive or represent them, is the revolution at the heart of the post-Kantian, postmodern understanding (and a feature therefore of any Integral Post-Metaphysics).

Notice that, even if a particular structure—such as the red meme, moral-stage 1, or the pluralistic value structure—does not *consciously* have a holistic outlook, the structure itself is holistic. But this is true for all holons, all structures, all whole/parts—the wholeness aspect is holistic at its own level or it would cease to exist (or it exists in a pathological or fragmented form). Thus, if we look at the structure of, say, the red meme, that structure, like all structures, is marked by wholeness, transformation, and closure (see below); but that does not mean that a person at the red level is conscious of the world as a whole, or has a fully integral awareness, or a holistic philosophy of life, or anything like that. The structure itself is a holistic (or autopoietic) unity in order to function, but that does not mean that the wholeness of that particular structure includes an awareness of the wholeness of all other structures or the Kosmos at large. In fact, only at the higher levels of wholeness does wholeness itself become a conscious content.

This is why researchers like Gebser and Loevinger give their highest levels the actual term “integral” or “integrated.” All previous levels, in their healthy forms, are integrated and holistic (at that level); but only the higher levels start to consciously perceive this wholeness and begin to become transparent to themselves. So all healthy structures are

holistic—whether in an atom, an ant, or an ape—but only at the highest structures (postconventional) does this wholeness start to become aware of itself: **wholeness aware of wholeness** begins to mark the actual contents of yellow waves and higher (which is also why adequate structuralism as a self-conscious paradigm emerges only at yellow and higher). But the point, in any case, is that healthy structures themselves are always holistic, representing the wholeness aspect of all whole/parts.

(We will see how structuralism differs from systems theory in moment; the essential point is that the structuralist is following the wholeness of interior structures of consciousness and intentionality, not exterior structures of matter, processes, dynamic webs and systems. The interiors need phenomenology and hermeneutics to be finally accessed—this is the “first-person” component of structuralism’s “third-person of first-person”; whereas systems theory never met an interior it cared about—it is “third-person of third-person”—and hence treats interiors only insofar as they can be objectified and known by description, not acquaintance. Thus, the systems theorist treats both the players and the tokens in third-person terms as exteriors in a dynamic holistic system connected via information: systems theory is a third-person of third-person realities [**3p x 3p**], unlike structuralism, which is a third-person of first-person [**3p x 1p**], and hermeneutics, which is a first-person of first-person [**1p x 1p**]. Needless to say, all of those methodologies are valuable ingredients in any integral methodological pluralism.⁶ But what we are doing in this section is looking more closely at the types of methodologies that best access zone #2—the **3p x 1p**—or the outsides of the interiors, in both singular and plural forms, foremost among which is adequate structuralism.)

As we were saying, structuralists attempt to elucidate the wholeness aspect of an interior whole/part or holon. This wholeness is called the “structure.” Some of the truly brilliant structuralists have included Jean Gebser, James Mark Baldwin, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Abraham Maslow, Erik Erikson, Clare Graves, Robert Kegan, and Jane Loevinger, among many others (all of whose work we will return to shortly).

Early, pioneering structuralists included Levi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, early Foucault, and Lacan, among others. Unfortunately, as often happens, their pioneering but less-than-adequate paradigms and theories came to define “structuralism” as a whole, so that when the “post-structuralists” came along, they interpreted poststructuralism as going beyond structuralism altogether, whereas it was simply trying to go beyond *inadequate* structuralism (and ended up beneath adequate structuralism). In the following, “structuralism” always means **adequate structuralism**, or competent structuralism as judged by the ongoing knowledge-community of those engaging the paradigm.

Because “structures” have caused so much confusion—especially in light of postmodernism’s self-definition of being “post” structuralist—let’s look more closely at the types of structures that even postmodernism has not coherently denied or deconstructed.

The Meaning of a Structure

The notion of a “structure” is by no means confined to structuralism. In fact, the general idea of “structure” is used by virtually all schools of biology, psychology, and sociology, among others. The *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* defines structure as “A term loosely applied to any recurring pattern....” The *Penguin Dictionary of Psychology* gives: “An organized, patterned, relatively stable configuration.” No serious theoretician doubts that those types of structures exist.

Structuralists simply specialize in studying those recurring patterns, those Kosmic habits or configurations. As we saw in Excerpt A, adequate structuralists generally define a structure as a “*holistic, dynamic pattern of self-organizing processes* that maintain themselves as stable configurations through their ongoing reproduction.” As we also saw in Excerpt A, for AQAL metatheory, that the simplest way to look at these patterns is as a probability space. The “structure” of an individual agency and/or a cultural nexus-agency is simply the probability of finding, in a particular locale of the interior dimensions of the AQAL matrix of indigenous perspectives, the behavior that is described or defined as “within

the structure.” Whatever else a “structure” might be, the least objectionable way to define it is simply as a **probability space**. Technically, then, for integral metatheory, structuralism means an exterior description in third-person “it”-terms of the probability of finding a particular “I” or “thou/we” behavior in a particular spacetime milieu of the AQAL matrix.⁷

(Of course, there are only so many words to go around, and “structure” is commonly used in a very broad sense to mean any form, pattern, or agency in any of the quadrants—interior or exterior, individual or communal. Sheldrake, for example, uses “structure” in defining morphic resonance; Maturana and Varela use it in describing structural coupling; psychologists use it in describing stages of development; sociologists use it in defining aggregate behavior; neurologists use it for tissue formation, and so on. When I refer to a structure as being a probability wave, I am using “structure” in the broad sense, referring to the enduring pattern or regime of any holon in any quadrant—such as the structure of a molecule, the structure of a town, the structure of the green meme, and so on. “Structure” in the narrower sense means an interior structure, particularly those elucidated by the paradigmatic practice of adequate structuralism. Hopefully context will make it clear which use is intended—because if not, then my and your communicative intersections will not be internal to a “we” and thus you will have no bloody idea what I am talking about. Like probably just happened with that sentence.)

Structuralism Compared with Systems Theory

Notice again the terms that adequate structuralists use when referring to a structure: “a holistic, dynamic pattern of self-organizing processes that maintain themselves as stable configurations.” Already you can see that those are *third-person “it” terms*. In fact, all of the structures proposed by structuralists (such as the rules of chess, the turquoise meme, formal operational cognition, the relativistic-pluralistic value structure, the construct-aware self, fourth-order consciousness, the green meme, the preconventional stage, etc.) are *not* described in first-person terms but in third-person terms; but those third-person terms (or

signifiers) take as their *referent* first- and second-person interiors. That is a crucial point. The structuralist primarily studies behavior but is not a behaviorist; and the structuralist primarily describes systems but is not a systems theorist.

The reason is that structuralism is the study of an *interior* as seen from *outside* its own phenomenological boundaries (in a third-person stance)—but of necessity, *within the boundaries of a larger “we”* (or a first-person plural stance)—hence, the objective, third-person, outside, “scientific” study of first-person interior realities (individual or cultural).⁸ Systems theory does not attempt to get at a “we” (nor are the types of “we’s” that it is inextricably involved with highlighted by its own methodology)—in no case does typical systems theory access the interiors of first- and second-person event horizons. That is why we say that structuralism is the study of the behavior of interior wholes (3p x 1p); systems theory, the behavior of exterior wholes (3p x 3p).⁹

When researchers engage in the social practice of systems theory, they are particularly interested in describing the behavior of observable systems; they are describing the exterior behavior of compound individuals such that their relationships or exterior interactions are internal to a social system or nexus-agency. They might take an “inside” view of this exterior system (such as Luhmann’s social autopoiesis) or a more traditional “outside” view (such as standard systems theory), but at no point do they attempt to get at the first-person (singular or plural) dimensions of the holon. They look at the inside or outside of the exteriors, not at the inside or outside of the interiors.

In short, the typical systems theorist does not attempt to get at the “I” or the “we” of a holon, but only at the “it” and the “its” of a holon. The autopoietic as well as traditional systems theorists are not trying to describe the feelings, prehensions, desires, impulses, insights, luminosities, raptures, satoris, or samadhis of any holon anywhere—and, frankly, as systems theorists, could not possibly care less. And if they are interested in such interiors, they immediately translate them into third-person terms and refer to subjective interiors as consisting of data processing modules, information transfer through neural nets

and synaptic pathways, linguistic processing units, cognitive computations, digital data bits, and so on. I am not saying those things don't exist, simply that those things are the insides of exteriors, not the insides of interiors.

The structuralist, like the systems theorist, is working (at least in part) with *a knowledge by description*, or a third-person description of a holon's behavior. But, unlike the systems theorist, the structuralist is working with the behavior of an interior holon—the behavior of an “I” or a “we,” not an “it” or a system of “its.”¹⁰ Structuralism studies the interior “I” or “we” holons from the outside *by following their behavior over time*—where “behavior” means the aspects of these interior holons that manifest in exterior behavior (verbal behavior, cognitive behavior, moral behavior, the moves that chess pieces make, etc.).¹¹ This means that *at some point* the structuralist must have some sort of access to those interior holons, or else the structuralist will actually have no idea what he or she is measuring, studying, or describing. A systems theorist, on the other hand, can study the traffic patterns of automobiles in a city, the behavior of an ecosystem, the formation of an ant colony, or the behavior of system of gases, with a little or no requirement to get “inside” the prehensions of those compound individuals. Simply following the relationships of their exterior interactions is basically all that is required (hence, a third-person of third-person).

A structuralist is also studying and describing *configurations of behavior* (either in an individual or a cultural holon). Those behaviors—such as verbal behavior, or the behavior of human organisms when they congregate in church, or the actions they take when they exchange money at the market, or play a game of chess—will indeed have exterior correlates (because all holons have four quadrants; and, of course, those physical exchanges are links or nodes in various ecosystems, social systems, geopolitical systems, and so on). But those exteriors *also* have interiors that cannot be reduced to or captured by those exterior exchanges, and therefore those interiors cannot be adequately known by description, only by acquaintance. Hence *those interiors themselves* cannot be accessed by systems theory, ecology, autopoiesis, behaviorism, or complexity theory, but only by introspection,

meditation, phenomenology, hermeneutics, tele-prehension, collaborative inquiry, and so on (i.e., the inside-interiors accessed *only* by methodologies of zone #1).

Once that acquaintance is made, by whatever means, those interiors can continue to be explored *from the inside* by, for example, phenomenology or hermeneutics (1p x 1p) or *from the outside* by various forms of structuralism or anthropology (3p x 1p). That is what we mean when we say that the structuralist proceeds by developing a knowledge by description of realities known only by acquaintance; and this is where structuralism runs into, and needs, phenomenology and hermeneutics, for they alone actually supply the “1p” of the “3p x 1p.”

To Kill Culture and Consciousness

For example, if I am going to try to study the structure, grammar, or syntax of the Greek language, I simply must learn Greek. Having done so, I can enact and bring forth a generalized linguistic workspace where I can exchange meaningful tokens and communicate with others in that linguistic world—I have established some sort of background solidarity *within which* mutual understanding can transpire: I am ushered into the interior domains of that enacted world (via hermeneutic shared horizons). I now have access to various “we’s” in that cultural space, and *therefore* I can study those we’s from the inside or the outside.

As a structuralist, I will choose to study them from the outside (but within the overall interior spaces of the we). Once on the interior of that linguistic/cultural space, I am not interested, as a structuralist, in trying to get to know individuals personally, or trying to interpret their particular meanings and values; rather, I am trying to stand back a little bit from the language itself and trying to spot any rules or regularities that it is following—just like the rules of chess. But I would not be able to follow these linguistic patterns *merely* from the exterior, because I would not know when a person is making a meaningful utterance or a meaningless noise (and therefore I would not know what to include in the grammar structure

and what to exclude: I would not know what is *internal* meaning versus what is merely *inside* noise). This is why systems theory has never been able to account for linguistics.

What I will find, as a structuralist, is that linguistic signs themselves do indeed follow patterns—patterns that are stable over long periods of time, patterns that represent the Kosmic habits of the intersections that people speaking the Greek language have developed over the centuries (and millennia), patterns that embody some of the many ways that sentient beings can touch each other within the felt spaces of shared horizons—and patterns that are sedimented, in this case, in the *structure* of the Greek language (which is to say, patterns that represent the probability of finding a particular type of linguistic behavior in a particular spacetime locale of the AQAL matrix, to put it in 3p terms; or patterns that represent the ways that two or more souls can feel their togetherness within the horizons of mutual care and understanding, to put it more 1p terms).

It is through a third-person look at these first-person realities that syntax and grammar can be elucidated in descriptive terms, which is nothing more than an elucidation of what Greek speakers are already doing anyway. This does not mean that the Greek language (*langue*) can be studied apart from, or in isolation from, everyday spoken Greek (*parole*), or that somehow its overall “structure” (synchronic) is isolable from its history and development (diachronic)—both mistakes the pioneering structuralists tended to make. As we will see in Excerpt E (subheading “Integral Semiotics”), the structure of a language (its **syntax**) cannot be isolated from its actual utterance and meaning-generating contexts (its **semantic**), both of which are linked in a **pragmatics** with the interior intentionality and exterior behavior of its speakers. (As we will also see, this allows us to draw on the work of Jürgen Habermas and his *formal pragmatics*, which is the only sophisticated linguistic theory that attempts to be integral, and which largely succeeds up to turquoise.)

When structuralism attempts to study, say, the developmental line of values in a human being (e.g., red values, blue values, orange values, green values), it must have some sort of understanding—hermeneutic understanding—of just what those values are and what they

mean, or else it simply will not be able to tell when a particular behavior is internal or external to a game. Structuralism is indeed going to study those values from the outside, and from the exterior, but only after, on the interior, it has figured out their general meaning and how to spot it. If, like systems theory, structuralism addressed merely the exterior behaviors, it would collapse all interior intentionalities into single place markers, and then treat the behavior of a human and the behavior of a truck as the same thing: one unit in the anonymous system.

This is why we say that approaches such as systems theory, ecology, and social systems inadvertently kill culture and consciousness. As approaches that wonderfully exemplify zone #4 (or “3p x 3p”), they are ill-equipped to handle the “1p” or interior realities of sentient beings, and thus the actual “sentient” dimensions of sentient beings are missed by ecology and systems theory. Let’s look at that point more carefully....

Ecology Contrasted with Structuralism

What I would like to do in this section is present several different examples of why you and I can share the same ecosystem—or exterior landscape—and not share the same interior landscape.¹²

Systems theorists are fond of saying that systems theory deals with the “whole of reality” and thus it covers all the holistic bases. For example, they point out that dynamic systems theory can even be used to successfully describe the traffic patterns in large cities. And that is true—the flow patterns of the automobiles follow specific patterns that systems theory captures well. But systems theory cannot tell you if the *driver* (i.e., the *intentionality*) of a particular automobile is red, blue, orange, green, and so on—and yet those interior domains contain the key not only to much of human existence and motivation, but to all of the feelings of sentient beings throughout the Kosmos. If all we do is describe the traffic patterns of sentient beings—using ecology, systems theory, chaos and complexity theory—

then we have indeed reduced all first-person consciousness to third-person objects, its, and artifacts: we have killed all culture and consciousness.

I am not saying that the automobiles don't follow those systems patterns; I am saying those systems patterns are only part of the story. As for the interior story—whether in a cell, a deer, an ape, or a blue meme—we have to look elsewhere, not to replace those approaches but to complement them.

The specific problem here is that, although all holons have (at least) four quadrants, so that all interiors have exterior correlates, nonetheless a very similar set of exterior physical realities can support significantly different interiors. For example, let's say somebody is in a theta brain-wave state (an exterior-objective state in the brain or UR), which has been demonstrated to support states of artistic creativity, certain types of meditation, and increased learning speeds (in the UL). But, as biofeedback pioneer Elmer Green put it, "If somebody is in a theta state, we can't tell if they are meditating or figuring out creative ways to rob a bank."

In other words, similar exterior landscapes can support quite different interior landscapes, because there is no simple one-to-one mapping of interiors onto exteriors. They inhabit phenomenological spaces that are not photographic negatives of each other, but follow their own often-quite-different, if not separable, topographies. All of the methodologies listed on the interior or Left-Hand quadrants in figure 2 (such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, and structuralism) are attempting to elucidate these interior, non-physically-local phenomena, in both human and non-human sentient beings.

Of course these interiors are inseparably connected with exterior realities, including exterior social systems and ecosystems, but the threads of connection are not topological; the thinnest communicative thread will let a person in Moscow and a person in Iceland develop a very strong friendship (a strong LL or cultural "we"), even though they are otherwise physically separated by thousands of miles and dozens of local ecosystems. Conversely, I can live next door to you, in the identical ecosystem, and still not be friends.

In a nutshell, solidarity and geography are not the same thing; sharing values and sharing physical space are not equivalent.

Just as with theta brain states (which are the objective exteriors of an individual) and the often different interior states of consciousness they can support, you and I can be in the same “theta ecological system”—the same objective exterior network—and yet you are meditating and I am figuring out how to rob a bank. The same ecological system can support a Gandhi and a Charles Manson. To say that the ecosystem is the primary and fundamental reality—and that both Gandhi and Manson should simply *live in harmony* with the ecosystem—is *actually* to say that “ecosystem” and “living in harmony with it” are NOT the same thing—which is exactly my point.

In other words, the crucial item, often unnoticed, in ecological approaches is that we can indeed live in harmony with nature or not live in harmony with nature, which means that nature is not the determining factor, which means that ecological consciousness cannot be explained by ecology.

This is not a trivial item about a few interiors; it applies to sentient beings across the board. Interior landscapes and exterior landscapes are indeed different aspects or dimensions of the same occasion—but the “different” is as real as the “same.” To take a pertinent example: in human beings, truly ecological values do not begin to emerge until the green wave of consciousness development, and they do not flourish until yellow. Prior to those waves of interior development, worldcentric ecological consciousness is not present—it is “over the heads” of beige, purple, red, and blue.

Worldcentric or global ecology is over the heads of purple-meme or tribal consciousness, which, as Clare Graves pointed out, “has a different name for every bend in the river but no name for the river.” Likewise global ecological awareness is beyond red-egocentric, and beyond blue mythic-membership. Only at green does such an awareness emerge, and only at yellow does it flourish—none of which can be accounted for or explained by ecology itself. In other words, the very realities that allow ecological consciousness to

emerge are not accounted for by ecology. (Which is why reducing reality to ecology is actually to devastate ecological realities.)

Since these stages of interior development leading to the capacity for ecological consciousness are elucidated only by structuralism, it follows that exterior ecology depends on interior structuralism in order to be effective at all.

Me and my blue interiors belong to the local Lion's Club; you and your yellow interiors belong to the local Integral Institute. We have already seen that this means that you and I share interior culture up to the level of blue; and thus we can converse within a meaningful "we" up to the blue level of discourse, because the signs and tokens that we exchange will have similar-enough referents up to the blue worldspace (and thus we will share a cultural solidarity up to that point). But green and yellow symbols, words, and signs will be "all Greek" to me; their referents are literally over my head, and therefore although I can hear their signifiers they have no real meaning for me. I am inside no "we" such that my intersections are internal to the patterns of those phenomenological spaces. I literally cannot see what you are talking about. Your yellow values include a worldcentric or global ecological consciousness; my blue values do not. We live in the same ecosystem, but only one of us has ecological awareness.

Any truly integral ecology would surely want to take all of those facts into consideration. In order to have sustainable economies living in harmony with ecosystems, human beings must have *interior* levels of development that can hold ecological consciousness: there is no sustainable exterior development without correlative interior development, no exterior landscape that can survive without an interior landscape capable of holding it. It does no good to emphasize the worldcentric Web of Life if people are still at egocentric and ethnocentric levels of interior development—which an alarming 70% of the world population is.

Notice that deep ecology, for example, which is a wonderful statement of the necessity of a *transformation of consciousness* in order to realize ecological interrelatedness,

makes the following types of statements, to paraphrase Arne Naess: “A human being’s sense of self-identity can expand from an identity with the individual organism, to an identity with the family or tribe, to an identity with an entire nation, to an identity with all of humanity. But it can also go one more step and find an identity with all of life, and that is where deep ecology starts.”

Agreed. But deep ecology has absolutely nothing more to say about those actual stages of interior transformation—egocentric to ethnocentric to worldcentric to Kosmocentric—stages that have in fact been studied in extraordinary detail by developmental structuralists. Deep ecology simply asserts the goal without evidencing an understanding of the path to that goal. And the reason for that lacuna or crippling omission, we were saying, is that ecology is essentially a zone #4 methodology, but the interior stages on the way to an ecological goal are elucidated only by zone #2 paradigms. Obviously an effective ecology would include both, because otherwise ecology promotes a goal with no path, a noble ideal with no means, a wonderful ambition supported only by vaporware and exhortations and recriminations, not effective practices.

A truly integral or AQAL ecology would take all of these factors into account. Integral Ecology is being forged by several of my colleagues at Integral Institute (e.g., Michael Zimmerman, Sean Hargens, Chris Desser), an approach that includes not only the intricate webs of ecosystems but the interior stages/structures of consciousness that allow the emergence of ecological awareness which itself wants to protect ecology. In our opinion, anything short of an AQAL or integral approach to ecology is likely to fail, not because it is wrong but partial. On the other hand, using an AQAL framework and its Integral Methodological Pluralism allows an integration of most of the major schools of ecology, each of which has an important piece of the overall integral puzzle. (We will return to integral ecology in [Excerpt E.](#))

Hermeneutics Contrasted with Structuralism

Call this section “Acquaintance versus Description: You Had to Be There.”

Hermeneutics, because it is the inside story of interiors (1p x 1p), involves a knowledge by acquaintance, whereas the other three zones, because they involve outsides and/or exteriors, involve a knowledge by description (i.e., the other three zones all have at least one “3p” in them.) This is perhaps the single most importance difference between hermeneutics/phenomenology and the other three zones, and it is this crucial dimension, needless to say, that is devastated by any exclusive reliance on the other zones (from structuralism to ecology to systems theory). This is why a reliance on structuralism, important as it is, cannot carry the day (as no zone—nor quadrant, nor level, nor line, nor state, nor type—can alone). This is vital to recognize, because structuralists, like any other advocates of a particular paradigm, can themselves become involved in various sorts of absolutisms (including quadrant absolutism, zone absolutism, and stream absolutism).

Me and my blue interior can read the book *Spiral Dynamics*, and I can memorize the descriptions and definitions of all the major structures and vMemes. I can memorize the words and signifiers that define beige, purple, red, blue, orange, green, yellow, and turquoise. If you ask me to describe turquoise, I might be able to do so perfectly. Does that mean that I am at the turquoise level or structure of development? Not at all. “Structures,” as we were saying, are third-person descriptions (in “it” language) of first-person realities, and therefore I can memorize the descriptions without actually being acquainted with those realities. I have access to these “its” by description, but I only have access to the corresponding “I” realities if I myself *transform* to those levels, stages, or structures and thus know those realities by acquaintance.

In short, knowledge by acquaintance involves transformation; knowledge by description involves translation.

(This is another way of stating the problem with ecology, an inadequacy that also hobbles most of the “new paradigm” approaches, because many people are simply repeating the descriptions of highly integrated waves of consciousness, an enactive web of life, nondual

awareness, and integral solidarities without having actually transformed to a knowledge by acquaintance of those integral realities.)

Robert Kegan (whose books—including *The Evolving Self*, *In Over Our Heads*, and *Languages of Transformation*—are superb exemplars of adequate structuralism), points out that it takes an average of five years for most people to move through any major stage of development. Thus, for example, if I am at blue (and lack worldcentric ecological awareness), and you are two stages of development ahead of me, at green (and possess a well-developed ecological awareness), and you are attempting to convince me that I should adopt an ecological perspective such as yours, then all you will have to do is wait 10 years for me to develop to that level, and then I will agree with you.

In other words, the idea that we can “dialogue” ourselves into ecological awareness; or that if we merely “learn” a new paradigm; or if we replace the mechanistic Newtonian-Cartesian worldview with a holistic worldview—all of those approaches are considerably off the mark. Precisely because those approaches lack the methodologies of zone #2, they are not cognizant of the stages of consciousness development that are necessary *in order to be able* to hold a truly worldcentric, holistic, integral worldview in the first place. As we were saying earlier, these approaches are, in effect, presenting a wonderful goal with no way to reach it; a noble vision with no path to attain it; an ecology that does little for ecology.

Path-less paradigms, alas. (Which is to say, paradigm-less paradigms, since paradigms are paths, not maps, and these approaches present nothing but maps of a territory nobody knows how to reach.) But that is exactly the strength of adequate structuralism and the wonderful contribution of zone #2 methodologies. We will return to the exact nature of structural research below, in conjunction with Carol Gilligan’s study of the stages of female moral development, and outline the gifts that structuralism brings to integral methodological pluralism, including an understanding of how to actually walk the path to worldcentric awareness (in ecology, politics, education, medicine...).

In the meantime, there is indeed a profound difference between knowledge by description, which we can know by translation, and knowledge by acquaintance, which we can know only by transformation. Individuals can learn the 3p descriptions, maps, names, and definitions of higher waves of development (including ecological systems awareness) without actually transforming to those higher levels, and this may ironically prevent them from taking the steps necessary to actually awaken these higher levels *in themselves* (and thus be of actual service to Gaia). This is a constant problem with new-paradigm approaches that offer merely descriptions without development.

And, for the same reason, it can be a problem with structuralism itself. Because it presents a wonderful series of 3p maps of 1p awareness, structuralism can inadvertently contribute to people merely memorizing the map and thus never discovering the territory. As usual, only when structuralism takes its place at the integral table can it be of service to a greater good. Structuralism can indeed describe the outsides of interior waves of consciousness, but those waves can be known from the inside only by acquaintance, only by transformation, only by direct touch in the living heart, a song that can be sung only from within.

Heidegger and Foucault: Classic Zone #1 and Zone #2 Approaches

An excellent (and extremely influential) example of the basic differences between hermeneutics (zone #1) and structuralism (zone #2) can be seen in the work of Heidegger and Foucault. Although they drew heavily on both zones, they also gave disproportionate weight to one of them, Heidegger focusing most profoundly on the meaning-generating nature of zone #1 and the necessity to get at it from the inside (1p x 1p), and Foucault standing back, in a monological overview, and surveying those events from the outside (3p x 1p) as structures that create worlds. Both were emphasizing the postmodern *enactive* nature of knowledge—we don't perceive worlds, we co-create them—but those enactive occasions were

approached from within and from without, respectively. Heidegger particularly looked at the “we” *from the inside*, and Foucault, *from the outside*—it’s almost that simple.

Dreyfus and Rabinow do an excellent job of summarizing Foucault’s approach and differentiating it from Heidegger’s: “Foucault’s devotion to the description of concrete structures understood as conditions of existence [i.e., structures that create or enact a world] bears a striking similarity to what Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, calls an existential analytic. But there is an importance difference. For although both Heidegger and Foucault attempt to... relate the ‘factual’ principles which structure the space governing the emergence of objects and subjects [i.e., enact a world], Heidegger’s method is hermeneutic or *internal*, whereas Foucault’s is archaeological or *external*. Foucault is explicitly rejecting both Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian hermeneutics when he opposes to the exegetical account the *exteriority* of the archaeological attitude.”¹³

For those unfamiliar with the world-creating power of intersubjectivity, that paragraph might seem a bit meaningless. If so, there is an example later—about fun things in Kansas—that might help clarify the issues (see “Vertical Outlaws,” Part IV).

In the meantime, what both Heidegger and Foucault are saying is that what naive awareness takes to be a pregiven world (given to everybody and just lying around out there) is actually co-created and enacted by various collective (or intersubjective) networks. I am simply suggesting that those world-creating networks (or “conditions of existence”) can be approached from the inside (a la Heidegger) or the outside (a la Foucault), a fact that Dreyfus and Rabinow recognize in that they themselves point it out.

Needless to say, in my opinion we would not reject (Husserlian) phenomenology or (Heideggerian) hermeneutics in favor of archaeology/genealogy, as Foucault attempted to do, but rather include all of them (in their adequate forms) in any integral methodological pluralism, inasmuch as they are all highlighting important dimensions of the native or indigenous perspectives of being-in-the-world. We will see why Foucault attempted to reject the interior approaches of both Husserl and Heidegger; and see also that what he was really

doing was emphasizing the zone #2 aspects not adequately incorporated by either of them, with the final remedy being an inclusion of all of them, not a food fight between them.

Foucault's work had many features, but it always focused on varieties of intersubjective networks and their power over individuals. Whether systems of discourse (*epistemes*) or systems of nondiscursive practices (*dispositifs*), these "vast anonymous networks" are responsible for a good deal of the co-creation of the world that naive consciousness takes to be given. Never has the social construction of reality found a more persuasive advocate than Foucault (even if, in its extremes, it turns on itself and needs to be shorn of its absolutisms); still, whatever one happens to think of Foucault and his work, after Foucault it is simply impossible for intellectuals with integrity to ignore the power of zone #2 and its indelible mesh in human consciousness.

Nothing can more thoroughly shake your notions of truth, goodness, and beauty than a sustained look at what previous cultures have said about them. This was Foucault's strength, an unrelenting and meticulous look at what previous ("archaeological") cultures authoritatively stated concerning notions of health, sickness, truth, goodness, right, and wrong, the vast majority of which change almost as often as hem lengths in fashion. As one psychiatric specialist put it after reading an early Foucault treatise on mental illness: "Well, if what he writes is correct, our discipline has no truth at all."

As I tried to suggest in Integral Historiography, there are two basic responses to the dizzying cavalcade of truth through the ages: one can dissolve everything into a pluralistic relativism (which, as soon as you assert that it—that pluralistic relativism—is the correct response, becomes a performative self-contradiction), or you can get sober and start looking at the developmental patterns that this unfolding evolution displays (in which case you are involved in genealogy)—those are the two main roads through postmodernism. Foucault had a hand in each, but he never ceased looking for an integrative framework that would include the important if partial truths of both.

Thus, after analyzing the shifting, culturally relative aspects of knowledge, Foucault invariably examined the constant or universal components of knowledge that would allow such relativism. For example, if we say that all knowledge is *socially constructed* and context-dependent (and hence all knowledge will change from culture to culture), *that claim itself* is a universal claim. It is claiming something that is true for all knowledge everywhere. That claim itself is not relativistic, not pluralistic, not interpretive, but rather claims to be universally true for all peoples, in all cultures, at all times. Cultural pluralism, in other words, is a universalist theory of knowledge. Thus, if you are going to assert that various cultures have different values, truths, and knowledge, then you must outline a theory of knowledge about why and how that can happen. Most postmodernists gleefully pointed out the first or relativistic part, but then catastrophically missed the second part. Foucault acknowledged and addressed both, another of his many strengths.

(This is why, in the wake of adequate genealogy, every comprehensive metatheory about anything must have a component that explains why and how the notions of truth, goodness, and beauty themselves evolve and change, while also showing various types of continuity, and this must apply to the metatheory itself. AQAL metatheory explicitly does so, by formulating items such as Kosmic habits, evolutionary emergence, transcend-and-include, post-metaphysical structures of being and knowing, tetra-enaction, and so on.)

Foucault accordingly had one major project in all of his work: he meticulously researched and documented historically shifting notions of truth, goodness, and beauty, and then asked, what is it about knowledge that everywhere allows this to happen? What are features found in all knowing that allow so much of it to shift? During his illustrious career, he came up with three major answers, all of which involved important and enduring contributions: archaeology, genealogy, and interpretive analytics.

We will be briefly discussing each of those as we go along, noting their important role in any integral methodological pluralism. The central question is always: how is it that various epochs allowed certain items to be “true,” and disallowed, marginalized, or suppressed

other truths? In his archaeology period, Foucault focused on verbal discursive patterns (or epistemes) that governed what could be legitimately discussed; in his genealogy period, on various nonverbal or nondiscursive practices that governed “truth”; and in his interpretive analytics, a way to integrate these various strands.

In his early work, Foucault highlighted the unfolding of various epistemes (or cognitive worldviews) that implicitly and unconsciously molded consciousness. An episteme determines both “what can be seen” in the world and “what can be known” about it. An episteme, according to Foucault, is “the *total set of relations* that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems [of knowledge].” Note, as always, the holism of the structures. These epistemes are not usually conscious to those whom they govern, but rather can be unearthed by neostructuralism/archaeology precisely because of its distancing (3p) component. Foucault later emphasized that discursive (or verbal) networks are embedded in nondiscursive (or nonverbal) social practices (such as body language, the physical shape of a prison, sexual practices, the hidden power-structures of knowledge, the unspoken rules of syntax). As we have often seen, a paradigm is not a theory but a social practice underlying theories; thus, we could say that Foucault went on to analyze various paradigms (dispositifs) underlying various theories (epistemes), especially as evidenced in different periods of human history.

For example, in *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault outlined four major phases of the “discourse on madness” in the West from the Middle Ages to the modern era: from the sixteenth century (“wise fool”), to the classical period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (“madness versus reason”), to the nineteenth century (“madness as medical illness”), to today (a “doubling,” with madness and genius ironically intertwined). In each of those periods, a dominant episteme (“discursive mode” or worldview) governed the types of things (and knowledge of things) that could arise in the first place; those epistemes themselves were coherent wholes or collective structures that related various parts to each other in such a seamless way that the world thus co-created seemed to be there from the start.

(In the terms of AQAL metatheory, the allowable discourse in any period were those types of statements that were internal to the regnant nexus or collective network-agency regulating communicative interactions, networks without which communication cannot occur at all, but networks that therefore screen out or marginalize all discourse taken to be peripheral by the network. In the example about Kansas that we will discuss in more detail later, what happened was that a town in Kansas recently banned the teaching of evolution; this means that serious discussions or “discourse” about the scientific theory of evolution are *not allowed*, they do not fit the prevailing episteme, they do not follow the law—and hence, they are outlawed—so that the regnant nexus of the political “we” of the town now marginalizes, excludes, or oppresses any discourse on evolution. This is classic Foucault, an examination of the process of translative **legitimacy** as it applies to **verbal-discursive behavior**: what is allowed, and what is outlawed, when it comes to what you can talk about without getting disciplined and punished by the “we.” Foucault, of course, was interested in helping to free us from the power of these marginalizing discourses, discourses that can only be spotted by zone #2 methodologies. We will return to this *emancipatory power* of structuralism in a moment.)

Foucault was approaching these collective interior events from the outside, in a stance of third-person looking, as contrasted to both Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian hermeneutics, which, for all their own significant differences, were attempting to maintain, with regard to interiorities, an inside stance of first-person touching (singular or plural, intentional or cultural, subjective or intersubjective, “I” or “we,” phenomenology or hermeneutics, respectively.). This is why, in the above quote, Dreyfus and Rabinow point out that “Foucault is explicitly rejecting both Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian hermeneutics....” Foucault himself stated that the cultural archaeologist isolates statements “in order to analyze them in an *exteriority*.... Perhaps we should speak of ‘neutrality’ rather than exteriority; but even this word implies rather too easily a suspension of belief, whereas it

is a question of rediscovering that *outside* in which, in their deployed space, enunciative events are distributed.”¹⁴

What Foucault was conveying is that, using the third-person dimensions of being-in-the-world that are highlighted with neostructuralism (the 3p of the “3p x 1p”), one could indeed get at aspects of the enactive, world-making nature of knowing that one cannot see or feel using other perspectives. These enactive structures (epistemes and dispositifs) are, according to AQAL metatheory, how intersubjective or cultural (first-person plural) occasions look when viewed from the outside in a 3p stance from the yellow wave or higher.

Thus: “Foucault and the hermeneuticists agree that practices ‘free’ objects and subjects [i.e., social practices co-create or enact subjects-that-know as well as objects-that-are-known, and they do so] by setting up what Heidegger calls a ‘clearing’ [worldspace], in which only certain objects, subjects, or possibilities for actions can be identified and individuated. They also agree that neither the primary relations of physical and social causality, nor the secondary relations of intentional mental causality can account for the way practices free entities. But they differ fundamentally in their account of how this freeing works. According to the hermeneuticists, who describe the phenomenon from the *inside* [hori-zone #1], nondiscursive practices ‘govern’ human action by setting up a horizon of intelligibility in which only certain discursive practices and their objects and subjects make sense. Foucault, the archaeologist looking from the *outside* [hori-zone #2], rejects this appeal to meaning. He contends that, viewed with external neutrality, the discursive practices themselves provide a meaningless space of rule-governed transformations in which statements, subjects, objects, concepts and so forth are taken by those involved to be meaningful.... The archaeologist studies mute statements and thus avoids becoming involved in the serious search for truth and meaning he describes.”¹⁵

Notice several items immediately.

(1) Foucault and Heidegger agree that the world is not given but co-created or enacted by the types of inquiry (practices, paradigms) used by individuals who engage that world.

They also agree that, although these practices include verbal and discursive aspects, they also involve “nondiscursive practices,” or the almost infinite number of ways that human beings interact that are not merely verbal (from everyday interactions, to body language, to the physical shape of a school building, to the unspoken rules of etiquette, etc.).

(2) Most significantly, note that “they also agree that neither the primary relations of physical and social causality, nor the secondary relations of intentional mental causality can account for the way practices free entities.” In other words, they both agree that this enaction (or world-creating) cannot be fully explained by “physical causality” (which is the **Upper Right**), by “social causality” (which is the **Lower Right**), or by “mental intentionality” (which is the **Upper Left**), but rather must also be explained by varieties of *cultural background* and *intersubjectivity* (which is the **Lower Left** and represents the postmodern breakthrough insight, which we summarize by saying that all holons have a Lower-Left quadrant, or that all occasions are tetra-enacted).

(3) From that agreement point, their paradigms diverge, depending upon which specific indigenous perspective or hori-zone they inhabit when they launch their social practice of inquiry. Heidegger and the hermeneuticists attempt to stay as close as possible to the insides of the interiors, elucidating the semantics and the meaning-horizons of intersubjectivity (or the ways that our intersections generate meaning for each other). Foucault, following the pioneering structuralists (which he updates into neostructuralism), wants to get outside of those meaning-events and see if he can’t spot something that you cannot see if you are too close to the phenomena; he therefore chooses a “3p of 1p” (zone #2) instead of a “1p of 1p” (zone #1).

(4) Because both of them are still focusing on the communal holon, note the striking similarity in both of them in the search for the nexus-agency (or the regnant nexus) *governing the intersections* of individuals in a cultural worldspace. For the hermeneuticist, as Dreyfus and Rabinow point out, “nondiscursive practices *govern* human action by setting up a horizon of intelligibility in which only certain discursive practices and their objects and

subjects make sense.” The hermeneuticist, operating within zone #1, is looking for the shared horizons of meaning that govern (i.e., regnant nexus) the types of interactions that will make sense to individuals in the first place. Foucault, on the other hand, dispenses with the insides of those event horizons and looks at them from the outside instead, so he is not concerned with their semantic but their syntax, not their feel but their look, not their meaning but their observed-structure—yet he is still looking for the regnant nexus, but this time described from without, not within. Hence, as Dreyfus and Rabinow explain, “Foucault, the archaeologist looking from the *outside* [zone #2], rejects this appeal to meaning. He contends that, viewed with external neutrality, the discursive practices themselves provide a meaningless space of rule-governed transformations in which statements, subjects, objects, concepts and so forth are taken by those involved to be meaningful....”

Thus, Foucault is particularly involved in the search for the **regnant nexus** of those interactions—he is looking for the “**rule-governed transformations** in which statements, subjects, objects, concepts and so forth are taken by those involved to be meaningful....” Those “rule-governed transformations”—much like the rules of chess or the grammar of native languages—are the regnant nexus of the cultural intersections involving those phenomena, a nexus that therefore governs the intersections internal to the nexus, and an interior nexus that the hermeneuticists are looking at from the inside and the neostructuralists from the outside.

Needless to say, for any truly Integral Methodological Pluralism, both of those modes of inquiry—hermeneutics and structuralism—grounded as they are in various displays of a calculus of indigenous perspectives, are indispensable. The main problem with any of these approaches occurs only when they suppose that they alone have the total story. Shorn of their absolutisms, however, they bring their extraordinary gifts to the integral banquet, a feast that would be so much less without them.

The Unfinished Project of Postmodernity

Foucault's approach has been called a "double phenomenology," in that he bracketed not only the *truth* of a statement but its *meaning* as well. In Excerpt C, we saw that phenomenology appropriately dispenses with questions of whether a mental image corresponds to some sort of concrete sensorimotor event, like a rock, and instead focuses on the texture of the mental event itself and its own felt-meaning, whether or not it has an exterior referent. Foucault went one step further and dispensed with even that; hence, "The archaeologist studies mute statements and thus avoids becoming involved in the serious search for truth and meaning he describes." As useful as that approach is, the question sooner or later becomes, just how far can you stand back from anything? That is, at what point does Foucault's approach move from "true but partial" into an absolutism—a zone absolutism, in this case—that starts rendering itself not only self-contradictory but monstrous?

The history of Foucault is a history of postmodernism in a nutshell. Now that the dust has settled, now that the absolutisms of postmodernism have been exposed, and now that postmodernism itself is beginning to adopt a smaller, more accurate self-image—and, as always, with 20/20 hindsight—it is becoming much clearer what partial truths were embraced, what absolutisms were exalted, and what remedial measures are helpful in rescuing the enduring if partial contributions of postmodernism. It is also clear that the one genius of recent postmodernism was Foucault. Even when someone like Habermas, in *The Discourse of Modernity*, engages Derrida, it is obvious that Habermas is unimpressed (ditto the likes of Lyotard, Deleuze, Lacan); but when Habermas addresses Foucault, he jerks alert; he approaches Foucault as one might approach a cobra: Foucault was simply brilliant—and dangerous—when it came to elucidating the extraordinary power that social practices have in molding what we call truth, meaning, and knowledge. After Foucault's contributions, no one can ever take intersubjectivity for granted. One must come up with a coherent explanation of the various types of cultural nexuses with which individuality is enmeshed (or the ways

that subjectivity is entrained with intersubjectivity), or reveal oneself as hopelessly pre-postmodern.

(This is especially important in any post-metaphysical approach, in that postmodernism's contribution to post-metaphysics is an elucidation of the ways that intersubjective networks co-create or enact worlds, worlds that metaphysics mistook to be pre-given.)

Foucault's trajectory is the trajectory of postmodernism: from structuralism (which really started it all), to neostructuralism, to post-structuralism, to a wobbling between poststructuralism and hermeneutics, to an attempted (but never quite completed) synthesis of hermeneutics and neo/poststructuralism.

It was structuralism—in its early, pioneering, and now largely outmoded form—that nevertheless first made it starkly obvious that individuals (subjectivity and intentionality) are following cultural patterns that are not apparent to the individuals so governed. Even if the form of pioneering structuralism is no longer adequate, that conclusion is accepted by all schools of postmodernism. The simplest example is language and the rules of grammar, rules that every native language speaker follows without realizing it. Structuralism—precisely because it looked at systems, webs, and entire networks of interiorities (structuralism is holistic culturalism)—immediately noticed that individual “subjects” were actually something of puppets whose strings were being pulled by what Foucault famously called “a vast anonymous system without a subject.”

What the neo/structuralists meant by that statement has often caused confusion, so let me give a simple example. Let's assume that Spiral Dynamics is a fairly accurate depiction of the values line. If somebody is “coming from” the blue value meme (or blue vMeme), much of what they are saying is actually governed by that blue structure itself, and in many ways what they are saying is therefore predictable, at least in outline. What is coming out of their mouths is in part the blue structure, not their own thoughts—which is why neostructuralists would say, for example, “It is language that speaks, not individuals who

speak.” The blue structure is “anonymous” and “without a subject,” because it is similar in all subjects. So it is the blue structure speaking, not the person, and the blue structure is a “vast anonymous system without a subject.”

Thus postmodernism would begin to speak of “the end of the subject,” “the end of man,” “the end of intentionality” (and even a “phenomenology to end phenomenology”), all of which were set in motion by early structuralism, which had discovered that individual subjectivity (or the Upper-Left quadrant) is set in cultural fields and networks (of the Lower Left) whose regnant nexuses are calling many of the shots.

The instabilities and inadequacies of early structuralism immediately gave way to two successors: neostructuralism and poststructuralism. Foucault had a hand in both. He pioneered neostructuralism, which took the fledgling insights of structuralism and reworked them in a much more adequate fashion (e.g., *The Archaeology of Knowledge*). Poststructuralism, on the other hand, had begun its own meteoric rise, which Foucault had also helped pioneer with his explorations of the ways that interiorities do not appear to be anchored in any exteriorities at all, but appear to be following nothing but the various tropes of language as it plays with itself.

Where neostructuralism had retained at least a semblance of grounding in the sensorimotor or exterior world—such that signifiers had some sort of contact with objective referents—poststructuralism severed that connection altogether and found only chains of sliding signifiers that had no referent apart from their own desires.¹⁶ Poststructuralism, a bit carried away with itself, attempted so aggressively to deny interiority that its famous “sliding chain of signifiers” soon became indistinguishable from a bad form of systems theory—poststructuralism had slid from zone #2 into zone #4: merely a 3p of 3p, surfaces of surfaces, shadows of shadows, with no interiority, no depth, no culture and no consciousness.

The result of the postmodern slide was famously stated by Bret Easton Ellis as, “Surface, surface, surface was all that anyone found...,” which one reviewer summarized as, “Everything reduced to the flattest surface.... *There is no within.*” The nihilism and narcissism

of extreme postmodernism, pluralism, and poststructuralism, especially in their deconstructive forms, increasingly came to the fore, eventually dominating academic discourse and ironically marginalizing alternative modes of discourse (ironic in that the postmodernist pluralists ended up exemplifying the marginalizing activity that they attacked). The postmodern poststructuralists all started sounding the same, as out of their mouths came the green meme, a vast anonymous system without a subject.

Foucault himself, as the bona fide genius in the postmodern parade, could be counted on to pick up the pieces and reweave them into something of enduring value, which he began to do in the last or third major phase of his work, where he circled back on various too-hastily-rejected truths and attempted to assemble them a sturdier framework—from archaeology/structuralism to genealogy/neostructuralism to ethnics/integrative.¹⁷

In Foucault's earlier work, especially the archaeology, he bracketed both truth and meaning ("double phenomenology"), and he consequently was himself disdainful of anything resembling "depth" or "interiority" language. His double bracketing ("a phenomenology to end phenomenology") therefore was excluded from depth and interpretation from the start: just the exteriors. Nonetheless, the sciences that he saw as beginning to escape the "Age of Man" and "humanism" were precisely those sciences that began to reintroduce the notion of depth and interiority—psychoanalysis, ethnology, linguistics.

("Humanism," by the way, was criticized by all postmodernists because it pictured an individual as the bearer of intentionality, will, and responsibility, whereas structuralism was beginning to show that much of those allegedly individual items were in fact molded by cultural nexuses of which the individual—and humanism—were largely unaware. Humanism, for example, would see a pluralist as operating from his own free will and choice, whereas neostructuralism would see the pluralist as voicing a vast anonymous system without a subject, principally the green meme. Thus, humanism had no way to get at the implicit, background, intersubjective, power-structures and expose them to a deeper emancipation: humanism could only produce green-meme individuals who naively assumed responsibility for

their own actions, and thus humanism could never free individuals from the green meme itself.)

As Foucault moved from archaeology and genealogy to ethics, he began an attempt to integrate both hermeneutics and neostructuralism into a more judicious use of “understanding from the inside,” or a reconstructed hermeneutics: his approach at that point has been called **interpretive analytics**, which is a wonderful phrase that captures his attempted integration of zone #1 (interpretive: from the inside) and zone #2 (analytics: from the outside).

But even when Foucault was rejecting interiority as a methodological ploy, he nonetheless had his own versions of it (or else he couldn’t have formed any sort of judgments in the first place). He himself describes his approach thus: “Whereas the interpreter [i.e., the disdained hermeneutics] is obliged to go to the depths of things, like an excavator, the moment of interpretation [his genealogy] is like an overview, from higher and higher up, which allows the depth to be laid out in front of him in more and more profound visibility; depth is resituated as an absolutely superficial secret.”

Foucault’s exterior approach, his bracketing of truth and meaning, his confinement to “mute” statements (monological), his “happy positivism”—these are all maneuvers of a zone #2 methodology starting hazardously to slide into zone #4: just the surfaces in cascading systems of 3p place markers. Even into his genealogy phase, “Genealogy avoids the search for depth. Instead, it seeks the surfaces of events....” Postmodernism had slid into its nihilistic endgame: endless surfaces that could not account for their own existence, nor even allow them.

As Foucault came to realize, cultural archaeology/genealogy is a legitimate endeavor, but it cannot stand alone. That approach by itself is deeply contradictory and self-annihilating: since it brackets meaning and truth altogether (truth is merely something so-labeled in a discursive system, or so employed in service of power), then this approach itself cannot claim that it is true. It hovers above the ground with no reason to be taken seriously.

Foucault accordingly came to see that it has to be supplemented with a more balanced view that includes not only nondiscursive social practices but also hermeneutic interiors (or, at the least, a better interpretation of interpretation). Dreyfus and Rabinow: “What Foucault offers in *The History of Sexuality* is an incisive example of what a *better interpretation* looks like.” As Gilles Deleuze would remark, Foucault came to “thinking of the past as it is condensed on the *inside*”—and not merely the outside, as the extreme exteriority of his previous work thought. Dreyfus and Rabinow conclude that Foucault’s approach at this point—“interpretive analytics”—was an uncompleted project: “Foucault owes us an interpretive description of his own right way to do interpretation. He has not provided us one yet.” Alas, his death removed that possibility.

Still, it is easy to see the direction in which he was headed. The whole point of a zone #2 approach is that, indeed, human action cannot be adequately accounted for by any combination of “mental intentionality” (UL), “physical causality” (UR), or “social causality” (LR), but must be supplemented with an understanding of the fields and networks of intersubjectivity (LL). That necessity bids us stay close to the intersubjective interiors that are being elucidated; therefore, as much as we might rely on the “3p” component of any “3p x 1p,” we simply cannot forget the “1p” itself, nor the methodologies that address those first-person realities. The only thing that keeps zone #2 structuralism of any sort (early, post, neo, integral) from sliding into zone #4 systems theory is its anchoring in interior phenomena, and thus any adequate structuralism has to acknowledge, honor, and anchor itself in zone #1.

Foucault came to see that both zone #1 and zone #2 are important, hence *interpretive analytics*. “This new method,” comment Dreyfus and Rabinow, “combines a type of archaeological analysis which preserves the distancing effect of structuralism [the exterior, objectifying, 3p component], and an interpretive dimension which develops the hermeneutic insight that the investigator is always situated and must understand the meaning of his cultural

practices from within them [the interior, intersubjective, 1p component supplied by zone #1].”¹⁸

And so it came about, in this wonderfully fractured fairy tale, that Foucault himself, after having led the wild goose chase of postmodern poststructuralism, circled back again to the enduring contributions of an adequate structuralism, which means, a third-person approach to first-person realities that actually honors both the third person and the first person, both of whom are, in the last analysis, sentient beings to be trusted.

Part III. Examples of the Social Practice of Adequate Structuralism

Basic Steps in the Paradigm of Adequate Structuralism

If we can switch now from an appreciation of the importance of including the “1p” in any

“3p x 1p” approaches, let’s look now at the importance of the 3p component.

The methodologies of zone #2 have one foot in both worlds, so to speak—the world of first-person realities and the world of third-person realities. (Typically, they are therefore condemned by both of those worlds, but that’s another story.) It is by using the paradigm or social practice of adequate structuralism that we can determine, for example, the steps necessary to develop ecological consciousness, given that ecosystems themselves do not produce ecological consciousness nor explain it.

How, then, does adequate structuralism work? In individuals and groups? (Let me repeat that in fig. 2, “structuralism” is listed only as the outside of first-person singular, not plural, which is labeled “cultural anthropology”; the reason is that structuralism examines the patterns or internality codes of a holon, and a collective or communal holon is a much more difficult and complex event than an individual holon. Structuralism can be, and is, used in

both, but finds its simplest application in individuals.) As an example of adequate structuralism, let's take a famous study and set it in an AQAL framework.

A poor man is married to a woman who is terminally ill. There is a medicine at the local pharmacy that will save her life. The man cannot afford the medicine. Does he have the right to steal it?

The background: Even when structuralists are focusing on individuals, they usually begin by studying large *groups* or aggregates of individuals, and they do so for several reasons.

First, there is the complex issue of transformation. We saw that, as a very rough generalization, it takes an average of about 5 years for a person to transform from one given stage to the next, because vertical transformation from one structure to another is generally a laborious and prolonged growth process. It follows that if you study only one individual, you will have to study that individual for decades in order to actually see any transformations or development. On the other hand, if you study large groups of individuals, you will catch many of them undergoing transformation, and hence you can study the development of structures more easily. With groups, you can study transformation.

Second, structuralism is a third-person approach to first-person realities (a description of the outward behavior of interiors known by acquaintance). But that means that a fair amount of the descriptive (or third-person) aspects of structuralism can be engaged in *without personal transformation on the part of the researcher*. The individual reading *Spiral Dynamics*, for example, can learn or memorize the definitions of the various levels without necessarily transforming to all of them. In terms of the first-person realities, this is a handicap; but in terms of the third-person aspects, it is a bit of an advantage. Just as a scientist can describe the behavior of a mountain lion without himself becoming a mountain lion (or directly communing with the first-person realities of a mountain lion), so a researcher can, to some degree, observe and describe the behavior of interior holons without fully entering into their insides. Of course, at some point hermeneutic entry is absolutely

essential to structuralism (it's the first-person component of structuralism), but a good deal of the third-person component of structuralism is just that: an outside view of the behavior.

What that means—and this is one of its great strengths—is that structuralism as a mode of inquiry allows a researcher to initially observe a large number of transformations without himself having to personally transform. That is the advantage of the “distancing” contained in its third-person components. If it takes the average person five years to transform, then any given researcher could study *by acquaintance* only one structure every five years or so. But the third-person or descriptive component of structuralism, by temporarily removing the structuralist from the burden of first-person transformation, allows the researcher to follow and observe various outward aspects of the development of a large number of structures and stages that he or she would never be able to observe if confined to the necessities of only first-person methodologies.

This is why these important stages of consciousness evolution cannot be seen or accessed by “first-person of first-person” paradigms—*these stages of development cannot be seen by collaborative inquiry, participatory epistemology, action inquiry, hermeneutics, or phenomenology*. You can introspect all you want, or practice collaborative inquiry and hermeneutics and participatory pluralism all you want, and you will not see these types of stages.¹⁹

Nor will meditation disclose these particular types of developmental stages. Sit on a zazen mat for years, and you will never see a thought that says, “This is stage-3 morals, this the multiplistic value structure, this is the conscientious self-sense,” etc. These important stages are invisible to zone #1. Nor, of course, will you see these stages if you practice merely zone #3 or #4 methodologies, such as systems theory or ecology. They are, rather, the special gift of the zone #2 event horizon of indigenous perspectives.

Take the example of the medicine for the ill wife. Should the husband steal the medicine? If you introspect your own awareness for an answer, you might begin to morally reason about this dilemma and come up with some sort of answer. It might be a very good

answer, too. Or perhaps you might discuss this issue with some friends or colleagues, and engage in a hermeneutic or collaborative inquiry to see what answer seems most appropriate. The former is a first-person of first-person singular, and the latter is a first-person of first-person plural. Both are extremely valuable paradigms or modes of human inquiry.

But none of those methodologies, no matter how intensively engaged and successfully completed, will ever reveal stages or waves of the moral response—unless you and your friends are willing to have that conversation for a decade or two. What the structuralist does instead is simply pose that question to very large groups of individuals and then note, say, their verbal and cognitive behavior in response to those questions. What structuralists have found is that individuals tend to give three very different responses to that particular question—should the husband steal the medicine? The first response is “yes”; the second is “no”; and the third is “yes.”

Response 1 is yes, the husband should steal the medicine. Why? Because what is right is what I say is right. What is morally right is whatever I want, and if I want to steal it, I’ll steal it.

Response 2 is no, the husband should not steal the medicine. Why? Because what is right is what society and the law says is right, and the law says you cannot steal the medicine, and therefore the husband should not do so under any circumstances.

Response 3 is yes, the husband should steal the medicine. Why? Because there are larger principles involved here, and in this case, life is more important than a conventional rule amounting to a few dollars. Life is more valuable than that.

What the structuralist has done is pose a dilemma to a group of individuals, note the responses to that dilemma, and then see if those responses show any pattern (or fall into any types or classes). This, for example, is exactly what Carol Gilligan did with the research summarized in her book *In a Different Voice*. Instead of “Should the husband steal the medicine?,” one of her questions was, “Should a woman be allowed to have an abortion?” Gilligan, too, *found the same three general responses* that I just summarized: yes, she has the

right to an abortion; no, she does not have the right to an abortion; yes, she does have the right. (Those classes of responses are, of course, the outside or third-person descriptions of the interior realities of the individuals responding to the questions. Hence, a third-person of first-person.)

If the structuralist notices any *general classes* of responses, such as the ones Carol Gilligan found, then the structuralist might follow that same group over a period of a year or more. If it is a large group, and if the responses that the structuralist noticed are actually stages, then the structuralist will find the following: if a person who originally gave one response *changes* her response, it is in the direction of the next response, not in the direction of the previous response. In other words, if the person originally gave response 2, and if she then consistently changes her response, it is always to response 3, not 1. In short, there is a *directionality* here, or a *stage sequence*, at least for that group.

Thus, if the first general step of adequate structuralism is noticing any *classes* of responses, the second step is trying to determine if those classes are actually *stages*—that is, if they emerge in a sequence that cannot be altered by social or environmental conditioning. (If they are real stages, the reason they cannot be altered by social conditioning is the same reason that the sequence “atoms to molecules to cells” cannot be altered by environmental conditioning—you can’t have cells first and then atoms, because cells are composed of atoms. True stages are compound individuals that become ingredients, elements, or subholons in succeeding compound individuals, and you cannot alter that sequence without destroying it, just as you cannot change the sequence “letters to words to sentences”: you cannot first have sentences and then words, no matter how much social or environmental conditioning you apply to somebody. The same is true of real stages in any realm. They represent the directionality of development or evolution in that realm—what Prigogine calls “the asymmetry of time’s arrow”—and that directionality cannot be reversed without destroying the entire sequence. They represent, in fact, what we are calling *Kosmic habits* in that realm.)

The structuralist therefore follows this group over a period of years—a longitudinal study—and watches very carefully the sequential relation of these classes of responses. If they do indeed emerge in a sequence that does not seem alterable by environmental conditioning, then the structuralist provisionally accepts that these classes of responses are stages in a developmental sequence of some sort (at least for this group).

At the next step, structuralists generally attempt to extend their studies to larger groups in an attempt to determine how “local” or how “universal” these stages might be. This is a purely reconstructive inquiry after the fact—it is an empirical inquiry in that sense. As we have seen in previous excerpts, some stages apply only to a few people, some to small subcultures, some to cultures, some to humans in general, but this is a matter of *actual research* by those versed in the social practice of adequate structuralism (grounded in adequate hermeneutics). No competent structuralist has ever implied stage sequences for individuals without appropriate evidence.

If these responses continue to appear to be stages—whether local or universal—then at some point, the structuralist will very likely attempt to zero-in on the actual *structure* of each stage itself (which is obviously the heart of structuralism). We will return to this last and important step in a moment.

Holism: The Great Gift of the Third-Person Indigenous Perspectives

First notice our original point: a structuralist does not necessarily have to transform to all of those stages in order to study aspects of their behavior. For example, a researcher herself might be at Gilligan’s stage 2 and still be able to notice and describe the outward behavior of responses 1, 2, and 3. That is one of the advantages of structuralism: it allows certain major transformations to be seen that would never be seen otherwise.

It is the third-person component of structuralism that confers this temporary freedom on the researcher, a freedom that, within obvious limits, all third-person approaches share. The whole point about being a third person is that you are *not* a first person, and

although that means you lack the strengths of a first-person view, it also means you lack the weaknesses.

The reason that third-person approaches are so valuable, and the reason they have always been considered a cornerstone of sound epistemology, is that they do not stop inquiry with how “I” or “we” might view this event. Rather, if you and I want to make sure that what we just saw is actually real—and not just a hallucination on our part, on a prejudice that we are caught in, or a distorted perception, a mistaken view, an unfair bias, and so on—then we will call in other people—we will call in numerous *third persons*—and we will ask *them* to look at what *we* just saw and find out if *they* see the same thing. The more third persons that we bring in, and the more of them that tell us that they *see the same thing*, then the more likely that what we saw was real. The third-person approaches (or the third-person components of any approaches) thus attempt to determine the types of things that any competent person might see if they approach this particular event with this particular paradigm. (Which is why they are the foundation of most sciences—physics, biology, chemistry, systems theory, and ecology). The third-person approaches are the great curb to narcissism (and hence are the first approaches denied by boomeritis), and they are the approaches most dedicated to truth for all, not just truth for me or truth for us.

The only time the third-person approaches run into trouble is when caught in their own absolutisms—which is, alas, pretty much all the time (like virtually all the other major paradigms and zones, each of which is a partial truth often intent on being the whole). Still, that is technically called scientism, not science. The third-person approaches as part of an integral methodological pluralism are the great anchors of truth; when used exclusively, they are the great robbers and destroyers of the interiors—as we have often seen, they (intentionally or unintentionally) kill culture and consciousness.

The third-person approaches, as a rightful part of a more integral embrace, are also useful for the panoramic view that they can offer, even to an individual’s perception. I can **look** at a tree from an objective or **third-person** distance, and I can also **feel** the tree up

close in a **first-person** touch: both approaches are important. But the 3p or “looking” approaches become *mandatory* when it comes to *whole networks and systems*—for example, when it comes to forests and not merely trees—because you can only see forests, you cannot touch forests.

That is, only the modes of inquiry that have a “3p” component in them actually see wholes, systems, and networks, all of which can only be perceived/conceived from a distance. The methodologies from zone #2 (**3p x 1p**) and zone #4 (**3p x 3p**)—precisely because they have 3p components—are therefore our only major sources of information about **holism** of any sort (whether the interior holism of structuralism or the exterior holism of systems theory and ecology). Wholes can indeed be felt from within, but not adequately seen or conceptualized. These profoundly important zone #2 approaches—by enacting, bringing forth, and highlighting the third-person dimensions of being-in-the-world—indeed remind us of the many ways that we are in this together. This honoring of holism is perhaps the greatest of the many gifts of the zone #2 paradigms of indigenous perspectives.

Harmonic Resonance

At some point, as we were saying, structuralism is both grounded in, and must directly re-connect with, hermeneutics, a move not overtly required by the merely 3p approaches, such as traditional systems theory or ecology. With systems theory (or any “3p x 3p” approach), you and I might be studying, say, a particular gorilla and his family as they forage for food in the wild. Using the paradigm of ecological systems theory, we are looking at their objective behavior, what they eat, when they eat, how often they eat; the types of local flora and fauna that support the gorilla family; changes in the local ecosystem and how they affect the gorilla family; and the entire web of observable inter-relationships and their intricate impact on each other. In short, we are studying the objective (and interobjective or third-person plural) dimensions of the gorilla family and its ecosystem. In order to make sure that we are not mistaken, we bring in other researchers to look at the situation: they are third

persons looking at our third-person research (“3p x 3p”). If these third persons see the same third-person events that we did, then that increases the likelihood that what we saw was real (e.g., the gorillas in this local ecosystem eat an average of 5 kilograms of bananas each week).

The structuralist, on the other hand, is not studying merely the *exterior* behavior in order to see any *exterior* patterns (objective or interobjective), but *exterior* behavior in order to deduce *interior* patterns (subjective or intersubjective). Unlike a systems theorist, who is content to abstract his abstractions and thus work a third-person of third-person realities—never prehending or attempting toprehend the *interiors* of the “its” that he studies—the structuralist must work *within* a hermeneutic space, because her endeavor is a third-person OF first-person realities.

In this case, if we are attempting a hermeneutic of gorilla felt-meaning, we would attempt to discern, feel, intuit, or resonate with the interior of the gorilla himself. The great ape family has a very sophisticated symbolic and signaling capacity, capable of communicating numerous interior states of hunger, desire, irritation, rage, urgency, and jealousy. How do we know that? Because the humans, including the scientific researchers, who have actually spent time with the apes say so. The humans who interact with apes almost unanimously assert that those sentient beings—the apes—have the capacity to feel those feelings. These humans are spontaneously engaged in a native hermeneutics or a native resonating with the interiors of other sentient beings, in this case, the apes. In the previous excerpt we called this *harmonic resonance* or *empathic resonance*.

According to AQAL metatheory, because both humans and apes possess a limbic system, this indicates that they can also *share interiors* up to that level of evolutionary complexity (as well as a significant amount of neocortex signs and symbols, including a rudimentary language). This means that both humans and apes can *share cultural solidarity* up to at least that general region in the AQAL matrix—they can share interiors up to that level. Hermeneutics looks at those interiors from the inside (e.g., “What is the ape

feeling?”), structuralism looks at those interiors from the outside (e.g., “How do those feelings manifest in the ape’s behavior?”)—and hence structuralism must use hermeneutics to get started, and to finish. (Systems theory, of course, ignores those interiors altogether and examines only interobjective exteriors, which is fine for what it does.)

Here is a typical dictionary entry for gorillas (*Microsoft Bookshelf*): “Gorillas are shy and amiable creatures, usually living in groups of 5 to 15. Mature males may form all-male groups or loosely attach themselves to other bands. Gorillas build makeshift camps each night after a day of foraging for vegetation. Their calls include a hooting sound uttered as an alarm signal, sharp grunts for invoking discipline, and low growls for expressing pleasure.”

“Living in groups of 5 to 15” is an example of a third-person or objective fact or claim; but note the words “shy,” “amiable,” “alarm,” and “pleasure”—those are all clearly on the first-person or hermeneutic side of the street, and rightly so. How do we know apes have those feelings? Well, like we said, and like with all first-person aspects: *you had to be there*—so hang around gorillas for a while and see what you think. As noted, virtually every third person who does so claims that gorillas feel desire, alarm, pleasure, jealousy, rage.... And if those humans study ape behavior *as motivated by those feelings*, then they are engaged in structuralism by whatever name: a third-person look at first-person feelings (as they manifest in behavior and are deduced from that behavior). Hence, **3p x 1p** in an integral calculus of indigenous perspectives.

Nobody is denying that hermeneutics is the hard part of that or any knowing; hermeneutics is just as hard to do with humans as with apes, dogs, deer, bacterium, or any other sentient holon. And, obviously, the lower the holon, and the “less” interior it has, then the less a human can easily resonate with it (and hence must resort more to the third-person side of the street). But “less” interior does not mean “no” interior; and “hard to do” does not mean “therefore can be completely ignored.” Certainly when it comes to any integral methodological pluralism worth its name, to dismiss hermeneutics is to dismiss the entire within of the Kosmos—as we said, to completely kill culture and consciousness.

This is why so much of the great and enduring research on the ape family has come from investigators—Dian Fossey and Jane Goodall, for example—who either intuitively or methodologically used both hermeneutics and structuralism to access the phenomenological reality of those rather extraordinary sentient beings.

(Would it help to point out that they were women? And that women tend to natively emphasize first-person and not just third-person? And probably do so for evolutionary reasons? And that they...., well, that is another story, surely....)

Structures Inside and Out

The thesis of AQAL metatheory is that the four quadrants—the indigenous perspectives—“go all the way down,” but that their *self-reflexive grasp* tends to emerge only at senior waves of evolution. By the time we get to humans, any systematic methodology must take the quadrants (and their zones) into conscientious account, and that certainly applies to structuralism and hermeneutics.

This is why we have been saying that in order to finally and fully describe a structure or stage of development, I must know that structure both from within and from without. A structuralist cannot give an authentic or adequate account of moral-response 3 without herself inhabiting that wave and knowing it by acquaintance. If a particular researcher is gifted, and she herself is predominately wave 2, she can nonetheless spot many higher waves in their outward form or behavior; but at some point other researchers who are at those waves will do a more competent job in knowing that wave from both within and from without, and will therefore do a better job of elucidating the structure of the agency itself.

Hermeneutics alone would never be able to spot these stages (since, as a first-person of first-persons, it is confined to the within of its own horizon, horizons that transform every five years or so, on average), and structuralism alone would never be able to elucidate them (since, as a third-person of first-persons, the third person of the researcher herself may or may not be at the first-person stage being studied). Systems theory, of course, can neither

spot interior stages nor elucidate them (nor does it care to, which is fine, as long as it does not violate the nonexclusion principle). Integral Methodological Pluralism conscientiously makes room for all of them, and points to the disasters that otherwise result.

Structures as Interior Holism

We can now briefly listen to the heart of structuralism itself: a structure. The elucidation of a structure is the fourth and last major step in the paradigm or social practice of adequate structuralism (first: pose a dilemma to groups and notice any classes of responses; second: check to see if those classes are stages; third: perform cross-group studies to see how widespread those stages are; fourth: attempt to elucidate the structures of those stages).

For AQAL metatheory, a structure is simply a probability wave (in any quadrant). For the paradigm of adequate structuralism, the probability wave refers specifically to the pattern or agency of interior holons—their internality codes or coherence profile (the “wholeness” aspect of the whole/part holon), whether in an “I” or a “we.” For AQAL, what all structures have in common is simply the probability of finding a certain behavior in a certain spacetime locale, and thus the safest orienting generalization is that an “interior structure” is a third-person description of finding a certain first-person reality in particular milieu of the AQAL matrix. Unless otherwise specified, in this section “structure” means “interior structure.”

The first and most central feature of a structure is that it is a dynamic holistic pattern; in fact, the simplest definition of structuralism is *interior holism*. The first major psychological structuralist was America’s greatest psychologist, James Mark Baldwin, working at the turn of the century. Following in his pioneering footsteps was Jean Piaget (rather literally; Baldwin ended up teaching in Paris, where Piaget was paying very close attention). Although nobody imagines that Piaget’s metatheory is adequate, even in the cognitive stream, nonetheless many of his contributions have endured among those doing adequate structuralism.

In Piaget's book *Structuralism*, he summarized many points about structures that are still useful today. A structure, Piaget explains, simply means a self-organizing holistic pattern. All schools of structuralism, he notes, take their cue from *wholeness*: "For the mathematicians, structuralism is opposed to compartmentalization, which it counteracts by recovering unity through isomorphisms. For several generations of linguists, structuralism is chiefly a departure from the diachronic study of isolated linguistic phenomena... and a turn to the investigation of synchronously functioning unified language systems. In psychology, structuralism has long combated the atomistic tendency to reduce wholes to their prior elements."

More precisely, according to Piaget, "The notion of structure is comprised of three key ideas: the idea of **wholeness**, the idea of **transformation**, and the idea of **self-regulation**." He continues:

That *wholeness* is a defining mark of structures almost goes without saying, since all structuralists—mathematicians, linguists, psychologists, or what have you—are at one in recognizing as fundamental the contrast between structures and aggregates, the former being wholes, the latter composites formed of elements.... Moreover, the law's governing a structure's composition are not reducible to cumulative one-by-one association of its elements: they confer on the whole as such overall properties distinct from the properties of its elements [they *transform* parts into wholes, which is what structuralists mean by *transformation*²⁰].... The third basic property of structures is that they are *self-regulating*, self-regulation entailing self-maintenance and closure.

The structure or internality pattern will almost always be some sort of holistic configuration, for the simple reason that the holon must hang together in order to endure; it must have some sort of unity or wholeness in order to exist as an entity. Parts of my dog

Daisy cannot head in different directions when she decides to walk across the room. A holon is always a whole/part, and the “structure” of a holon refers to the “whole-ness” or unity aspect, which is why structures are always presented as holistic, transformational, and autopoietic patterns.²¹ As Piaget eloquently explained, structuralists of all varieties have historically been united in their attempts to honor and recognize the wholeness aspects of occasions: they were the first great interior holists.

However, even though these structures or patterns tend to be stable, they are patterns OF things that are in constant dynamic flux. In a living cell, for example, not a single molecule remains in that cell over time; there is literally nothing concrete in that cell that remains unchanged—it is a constantly changing, self-renewing, dynamic flux. There is, however, one thing that remains stable and unchanged, and that is the pattern of the change itself. That pattern is the holistic, autopoietic, or self-regulating structure, which is why adequate structuralism is indeed marked by an elucidation of *wholeness*, *transformation*, and *self-regulation*. It is looking at occasions that already exist and asking, for example, how can some bacteria remain essentially the same for *a billion years* when all of their components change ceaselessly?

This is true for all structures (exterior or interior, although we are concentrating on interior). The game of chess, which we have been using as a typical example, is not dependent upon a particular set of material pieces. In fact, you can use 16 pieces of almost anything and still have a game of chess—it is the rules that define chess, not the material components, which, as in all structures, can be ceaselessly changed and renewed.

In short, structures (in any quadrant—whether linguistic, psychological, mathematical, biological, sociological) are simply self-regulating holistic patterns. Maturana and Varela’s concept of *autopoiesis* owes much to Piaget’s structures. Unlike many early structuralists, Piaget believed that structures underwent development—that all structures were con-structed.²² He was thus one of the first great constructivists (and in that sense he was a healthy postmodernist, itself a rare accomplishment), which means: *the world is not given*,

but constructed.²³ (Piaget is not often thought of as postmodern, because he believed in worldcentric or universal pluralism, a perspective that emerges with the yellow wave, and not ethnocentric pluralism, which emerges with the green wave and came to dominate postmodernism, and thus he was usually attacked by most postmodernists.) He also was one of the first to attempt to integrate synchronic (present) with diachronic (developed) structures, an integrative intent shared by all subsequent developmental structuralists.²⁴

Piaget was therefore the first great evolutionary or developmental structuralist; he gave the first consistent and highly sophisticated account of genealogy (which he called “genetic epistemology”), backed by research and observation, of how *different cognitive structures enact and bring forth different worlds*, worlds which are then taken to be given by the percipient but are actually (tetra)enacted by structures of consciousness. This was much more than the mere rhetorical assertion, offered by other postmodernists, that intersubjectivity creates worlds and hence knowledge is socially constructed; this was a highly meticulous research into exactly why and how that construction of reality occurs. Whereas most green-meme postmodernists, flying under the jet stream of integral awareness, used a constructivist stance to fall into pluralistic fragmentation and incommensurable lifeworlds, Piaget’s integral-aperspectival stance allowed him to see both universal deep features and pluralistic surface features—hence, universal pluralism—much as the rules of chess are similar for Malaysians and Manhattanites, even if no concrete or actual chess game is ever the same.

This allowed Piaget to give the first constructivist developmental view of the world that was not a performative self-contraction. (All pluralistic views exempt themselves from the relativity claimed to infect all views, and present themselves as universally true for all cultures, something their own theory disallows; hence, they contradict their own claims and dissolve their own credibility. This is why Habermas uses the *general* Piagetian frame as part of any coherent discussion of the evolution of culture; as noncontradictory genealogy, it has no rival—which is to day, adequate developmental structuralism is a crucial ingredient of any integral methodological pluralism). All of these accomplishments were truly extraordinary.

As it turns out with any great pioneer, the ongoing paradigms and practices of adequate structuralism have revealed phenomena that do not gracefully fit into the metatheoretical conceptions advanced by Piaget. Cognitive development, which Piaget believed to be the one central axis of development within which all other developments unfold, turns out to be merely one of at least two dozen developmental lines or streams (albeit a “necessary-but-not-sufficient” one); within cognitive development itself, there are levels or waves higher than formal operational thinking; development is not *decalage* as an exception but “levels and lines” as a rule; *states* of consciousness get little attention (and altered states, none at all); Piaget’s biologism is unnecessary but mostly surprising (from one of his genius); and Piaget’s actual *definitions* of the structures (such as conop) didn’t quite work out, although his *descriptions* of the behavior of the psychological phenomena at those waves are amazingly accurate and still stand up to ongoing cross-cultural research.

(Piaget adequately described the *behavior* of certain *interior* psychological holons but his *theoretical* model did not do them justice. In other words, the paradigm, injunction, or social practice of adequate structuralism brought forth a series of experiences or phenomena that Piaget then attempted, in an appropriately reconstructive fashion, to explain with a series of theoretical conceptions—since theories always arise within specific paradigms or social practices—and although his practice was adequate, his theories were not. But that is simply the definition of a great pioneer.)

But as for those descriptions of the behavior of the psychological holons internal to the agency of the structure (i.e., the behavior falling within the probability space) of the first four major waves of the cognitive stream (sensorimotor, preop, conop, formop), Piaget is still right on the money according to those doing adequate structuralism. As we have seen, it is not necessary that a particular structure be cross-cultural—a structure can be held in common by only two people, or perhaps a family, or a tribe, or a culture, or a nation, or sometimes all humans as far as we can tell, and sometimes all sentient beings (as disclosed in Kosmic consciousness and Kosmic solidarity of a causal and nondual paradigmatic practice).

In that continuum, Piaget's descriptors up to formop are impressively cross-cultural for humans wherever they have been tested by researchers adequately engaging the practice, showing up in Amazon Rainforest Indians, Australian Aborigines, and Manhattan yuppies.²⁵ Some of Piaget's descriptors are even cross-species (e.g., cats go through the first four stages of sensorimotor cognition). As one of the many developmental streams of consciousness, the Piagetian cognitive stream takes its rightful place with the Loevinger self stream, Kohlberg moral stream, Maslow needs stream, and Graves values stream as among some of the major currents of consciousness disclosed by zone #2 methodologies. This particular stream has been further explored by present-day researchers from Robert Kegan to Michael Commons to Kurt Fischer.

Some people confuse "self-regulating" with "self-contained," which is not the case. All holons are agency-in-communion, or structures-in-exchange, where "structure" means the defining agency, the deep features, the internality codes, coherence profile, or the specific and enduring patterns of any self-organizing holon, and "in exchange" refers to the fact that all holons possess not just autonomous agency or closed self-regulating patterns, but also exist in networks of open communion, relationship, and embeddedness. This is why Maturana and Varela define autopoiesis as "a *closed* organization (or pattern) with *open* components." The "*closed*" part is the autonomy, stability, enduring pattern, Kosmic habit, or structure that allows a holon to continue to exist. The "*open*" part refers to the fact that, although the deep features or agency may be relatively autonomous (and hence self-regulating), the surface features consist of patterns of relational exchange with the surrounding environs, an exchange upon which every holon depends for its very existence. Thus, all holons are self-regulating but not self-sufficient, because all holons are always agency-in-communion (or coherence-in-correspondence, or being-in-the-world). Neither agency nor communion, neither autonomy nor relationship, neither coherence nor correspondence, are alone enough to define a holon.

The Structure of a Song

We have been following the general “steps” in the social practice of adequate structuralism: (1) a hermeneutic (first-person-plural) interaction in search of third-person **classes** of responses to a set of conditions; (2) longitudinal studies to see if those classes are **stages**; (3) cross-group studies to see the **applicability** of those stages—whether they are more local or more universal; and (4): the search for the **structure** or coherence pattern of each of the stages.²⁶

In this section, we focus on the fourth and last step. Once stages of interior responses have been identified, most researchers attempt to specify the coherence codes or structures of those stages—that is, the agency that governs the elements that are *internal* to that particular interior holon (individual or cultural, subjective or intersubjective, I or we).

We have been using the game of chess as an example of a structure. A musical song is another good example. A song can be played on numerous different instruments and still be the same song (because structures are not defined by their material components but by their rules of internal relationship). Moreover, many songs have universal resonance: Russians, Croatians, Aborigines, and Hawaiians can all hum the same tune and respond to it. A song has holistic deep features that define it (its melody, tune, internal arrangement of musical notes), which are the same for everybody; yet no actual song is ever the same, since it is sung by different people, using different instruments, in different times and places (universal deep features, pluralistic surface features).

Just so, there are many melodies, tunes, and songs in the human heart and soul, and structuralism is the study of those exquisite melodies. Whereas hermeneutics studies those songs from the inside, as they are being sung and shared, structuralism looks at them from the outside, not as pregiven ontological structures, but as unfolding, developing, and evolving patterns that emerge as human beings learn new and different ways to sing and dance. Some of these songs are so popular they become repeated over and over and thus settle into

Kosmic habits, and some of the really great songs of evolution become universal or planetary Kosmic habits.

The structuralist, after spotting a song of consciousness—or what appears to be a Kosmic habit followed by a particular interior holon (or group of holons)—moves from *descriptions* of that habitual behavior to possible *definitions* or elucidations of any underlying patterns, codes, or regularities—that is, from a description of the Kosmic habit the holon is following to a possible definition of the agency or internality of this habit.

The structure of a song is its melody, tune, or pattern. A person is singing that song when his or her vocal actions produce notes that are internal to that melody (or internal to the nexus of relationships among notes that define that song). Likewise, the structure of chess is a set of rules that the 16 chess pieces or tokens must follow; two people (or compound individuals) are in a game of chess (or compound network) if the behavior of the 16 tokens that they both use are internal to the game (i.e., follow the rules of chess)—the individuals are in the game, or inside the “we” situation, if the intersections of their 16 tokens are internal to the nexus-agency or rules of the communal holon. The structuralist is interested in those rules, rules that express the Kosmic habits or enduring patterns of the particular holon (and rules that therefore display wholeness, transformation, and closure or autopoiesis).²⁷

The game of chess has a structure, a bacterium has a structure. The major differences between them is that the former is an artifact, the latter, a sentient holon; and the former involves a compound network, the latter, a compound individual. Nevertheless, both have a structure in the broad sense, which represents the enduring patterns or Kosmic habits of its reproduction in spacetime. As we were saying, a structure in the broad sense is a *song*, not a material thing; it is a *flow pattern*, not a fixed entity; it is a *melody* that can be played by many different instruments but is not the instruments themselves. There are important differences between individual, communal, and artifactual, but what their structures all have in common is that they are like songs.²⁸ A song does not exist apart from some sort of

instrument (human voice, bird voice, violin, piano, etc.), but neither is it any actual instrument or combination of instruments, nor can it be captured in any sense by a description of the instruments playing it.

Thus, once structural holists have spotted a song (in an individual or cultural holon), they generally attempt to elucidate its melody or identifying pattern. Different structuralists have approached this task in different but useful ways. Some structuralists, like Piaget, have attempted mathematical definitions of these Kosmic songs and patterns. Other structuralists, like Erik Erikson, offered more literary descriptions of psychosocial patterns. Some focus more on the third-person side of the structural street; these are generally known as the formalists (e.g., a brilliant pioneer here, and still one of my favorites, is the incomparable Roman Jakobson). Other structuralists stay closer to the first-person side, the intuitional and hermeneutic side of the street (e.g., Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes). Many have attempted a strong synthesis of both the first-person and third-person aspects of structures (or the semantic and syntax of songs)—an early pioneer in this integrative endeavor (and easily one of the most gifted) was Paul Ricoeur. And, as we just saw, Michel Foucault attempted his own synthesis (of first-person interpretation and third-person structuralism) to arrive at an “interpretive analytics.”

Special mention, however, must be made of **Jean Gebser**, who comes to mind as perhaps of the greatest of the postmodern structuralists (not postmodern poststructuralists, who crash-landed). All adequate structuralists today are in fact **postmodern structuralists**, which I would call post/structuralism, except nobody will get it. (Still, every now and then, I’ll dust off that phrase, as in the title of this excerpt). Adequate structuralists or post/structuralists cover both sides of the street (3p formalism and 1p interpretation); recognize the relativity of surface features; are alive to numerous different levels and lines; and rest their claims only on careful research. Gebser was a wonderful exemplar here, outlining various structures of consciousness with wonderful lucidity and keen insight, often combined with literary greatness, making room for both the insides and the outsides of

interior holons. Reading such genius as Gebser always humbles one in the extraordinary generosity of a spirit willing to make so much room for so many radiant realities.

Earlier I gave a sampling of various types of structures that have been suggested by competent researchers (for convenience, here is the list):

Carol Gilligan's three stages of selfish, care, and universal care in female moral development; Robert Kegan's five orders of consciousness; Spiral Dynamics' elucidation of the blue meme, orange meme, green meme, turquoise meme, etc.; Jean Gebser's famous archaic, magic, mythic, rational, and integral structures; Jane Loevinger's symbiotic, conformist, conscientious, individualistic, and integral self-identities (etc.); formal operational cognition, the relativistic-pluralistic value structure, the construct-aware self, fourth-order consciousness, moral-stage 2, the participatory stage, preconventional stage, the conscientious self, sensorimotor cognition, and so on.

The simple point is that each of those structures is like a song; each has a unified wholeness that defines the types of phenomena that are enacted and brought forth by those structures; each represents the way a world is co-created and co-constructed by the structure of consciousness perceiving/enacting that world; each has a melody or identifiable structure (or internality code), which means, for an individual structure, that any phenomena within the structure are following that melody (are internal to its rules or patterns), and, for a collective structure, that any compound individuals are inside the structure when their intersections are internal to it; each structure or melody has deep features that represent the common elements of the song wherever it appears, as well as surface structures that are always different wherever they appear; none of these are pregiven ontological structures but rather the results of creative and emergent novelty that eventually settled into evolutionary habits (that are therefore, nonetheless, independent of particular individuals, and thus

preserve the “trans-individual” features of metaphysical levels or planes but without their ontological baggage).

In this section, we have covered a few of the great pioneers and profound gifts of the zone #2 approaches of indigenous perspectives of being-in-the-world. But there is one last group of structural pioneers we would be remiss not to honor, and they were in some ways the greatest of them all.

The Original Structuralists

The earliest structuralists were, of course, none other than the great metaphysicians of the spiritual traditions, as they outlined and codified the higher levels of being and knowing, the higher Songs of the Self Supreme.

Through unexcelled growth into the further reaches of human potential, they saw, heard, felt, touched, and realized deeper and higher realms of the Divine. When they returned from their journeys, they described what they felt and saw, and often outlined maps of these higher territories, for the benefit of those who had not yet taken the journey. They created third-person stories and maps (or a knowledge by description) of realities they saw first-hand (in a knowledge by acquaintance). In other words, they were the first great structuralists.

Classic **premodern structuralism** included the descriptions of journeys taken to the higher and lower worlds given by the great shamans, some of which (e.g., African, Tundra) reach back before history began, and possibly represent interior realities glimpsed by Eve herself (or the common ancestor of all humans now believed to have lived around 175,000 BCE). These pioneering shamanic maps, like all maps, were actually a four-quadrant affair, and thus their terms, structures, and symbols were embedded in particular cultural backgrounds and contexts; which is to say, their songs were part of an enacted worldspace expressing Spirit in its own unfoldment at that time and place.

As the cultural background continued to evolve and develop, and as red (magical-animistic) value contexts evolved into blue (or mythic-membership) contexts, structuralism began to take the form of a Great Chain of Being, an understanding of a Great Hierarchy of nests of being within nests of being, endlessly. The higher worlds and the underworlds were related in a great continuum of consciousness, and it was said that a human being could operate at any of these levels of awareness, depending upon his or her own spiritual realization.

The Great Nest of Being (like the shamanic maps before it) was simply a third-person map or description that the great saints and sages of that era often used to interpret their first-person experiences and realizations. The spiritual realizations were as authentic as authentic can be (just as the shamanic were); but the interpretations expressed the four-quadrant realities of that time and place (and particularly a blue-value intersubjective cultural context).

The two great currents of classical structuralism were, in the East, the authors of the Upanishads; and, in the West, the Pythagorean/Parmenides/Platonic stream. So widespread, so influential, so similar were these currents during that general epoch that they have been viewed as a type of “perennial philosophy,” which perhaps obscures more than it elucidates.

(The “perennial philosophy” is simply a set of abstract features that describe *a few* of the structures of the four-quadrant interpretation of being-in-the-world that was common to *some*, not all, of the cultures of that era, but that were *not* common features before that era, nor after it. The perennial philosophy is neither universal nor perennial, but simply an abstracted statement of a form that the AQAL matrix took in a few highly evolved philosopher-sages of that particular era.)

Although the structures they presented were burdened with ontological and metaphysical accoutrements that are, by today’s lights, unnecessary and outmoded, the higher realizations themselves were not, and the descriptions of these higher states are extraordinary, exquisite, and still as awe-inspiring as ever. The Great Nest, in virtually any of

its many interpretive forms, was one of the first profound realizations that Spirit manifests in a series of dimensions, grades, or levels of complexity (which also represent levels of care, compassion, and consciousness, to which human being can align themselves in greater circles of love and awareness). This morphogenetic scale of increasing unfoldment would reappear in the modern era as the theory of evolution (although shorn of its upper or transpersonal reaches, which AQAL metatheory analyzes as the “disaster of modernity,” but only alongside the “dignity of modernity,” which escaped much of prepersonal nightmares inherent in earlier eras.)

The greatest of these classical structuralists in the West was, no doubt, Plotinus; and in the East, Nagarjuna and Shankara stand out; but they are simply first in a very long line of geniuses: Maimonides, Luria and the Kabbalah, St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa of Avila, Chih I and T’ien T’ai system, Fa-Tsang and the Hwa Yen, Abhinavagupta and Kashmir Shaivism, the anuttarat Tantra or Highest Yoga Tantra in Tibetan Buddhism: all are breathtaking descriptions of interior phenomenal states and stages of higher consciousness (disclosed by the paradigm of meditation and codified by the paradigm of classical structuralism), higher levels that are third-person descriptions that can only be known by first-person transformation (using the paradigm or social practice of contemplation or meditation).

The best known of these great systems, and in some ways still the most compelling, is that of the 7 chakras, which are 7 structures of energy and consciousness. (In Excerpt G, “Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Subtle Energies,” we will return to the chakras and attempt to reconstruct them in a post-metaphysical or AQAL fashion.)

But what all of the versions of the Great Nest had in common was an understanding that levels of consciousness generate levels of reality (i.e., a hierarchy of knowing is also a hierarchy of being)—which means that these pioneers were, in their own way, the premodern postmodernists; and a few of the greatest—Nagarjuna in particular—give a more accurate, more profound constructive postmodernism than anybody before or since. But the weight of

background cultural contexts made a clean post-metaphysics impossible to come by on any sort of large scale, and the vast number of less gifted souls took “levels of reality” as pre-existing structures. Still, the thundering wonder of it all is that these great metaphysicians accomplished what they did, which was breathtaking. Even Bertrand Russell, archetypal rationalist and anti-spiritual theoretician, said that the most beautiful philosophy ever conceived was that of Plotinus.

The Emancipatory Power of Structuralism

Those are some of the great, classic, premodern zone #2 approaches—zone #2 approaches that, as always, demand first-person transformation to finally disclose the referents of those third-person descriptors. But those approaches also exemplify what is perhaps the primary incentive of using zone #2 approaches, both yesterday and today: their **emancipatory power**.

For all the reasons we outlined earlier, it is almost impossible to construct any sort of reliable map of higher states or stages using merely phenomenology, or hermeneutics, or systems theory, or any other conceivable approaches. Rather, you have to back up a bit, look at interior development not just in yourself but in others over a long period of time, and codify the various paradigms and practices that can be used to enact these higher domains. A great pioneer—such as Gautama Buddha or St. Teresa—might be able to traverse many higher levels of consciousness in a single lifetime and describe these higher domains to us, the less evolved. But even then, they are using structuralism—or a third-person description of higher first-person realities—in order to help emancipate us, liberate us, and free us, by pointing to higher dimensions that move beyond the narrowness, pain, suffering, and torment of less developed states and stages. They are using structuralism as part of the path of liberation: third-person maps that can only be realized by first-person spiritual practice.

Further, in presenting maps of higher dimensions of awareness, they are pointing out—and making conscious—the restrictions, limitations, and binding power of lesser dimensions. By pointing to a higher wholeness of higher structures, they are exposing the lesser wholeness of lesser structures. We can think of these as maps of higher realities, or, alternatively, as maps of illusion. These great pioneers, by virtue of realizing a deeper or higher reality—by virtue of getting out of the cave of shadows—could give us a map of the cave itself. That has always been one of the main driving forces of zone #2 methodologies: by giving us maps of the prison, make emancipation more likely. (AQAL, for example, is a map of the prison, not a map of Suchness.)

What do you think Foucault was doing? Same thing. He was describing how webs of unconscious patterns were limiting and narrowing our awareness. “Look at how these networks of power-knowledge control you,” he is saying, “and rise above them, be free of them to whatever extent you can.” It is only through zone #2 methodologies that such **emancipatory interests** can be effectively engaged and enacted, and that is as true today as it was in the time of the first shamans who pointed to higher realities not bound by the torments of lesser domains.

Short sidebar on Michel Foucault: I spent several years studying everything written in English by and about Foucault. It is always interesting that so many theorists, who have a genuine interest in various forms of emancipation, have gotten that interest by way of mystical, spiritual, or transcendental experiences, and Foucault was no exception. He had a life-long, deeply serious interest in “limit experiences,” particularly mystical experiences, as manifested in everything from the “mad poets” that he loved—Artaud and Nerval in particular—to extreme states of consciousness induced by sadomasochistic sexuality, which he believed pointed to an entirely new “economy of pleasure,” or new and liberating modes of distribution of sexual pleasure throughout the body. Combined with his own homosexuality (which

was harshly judged by the human “sciences” of his time as being pathological), his interest in mysticism, which was also harshly judged by conventional discourse, kept Foucault keenly aware of the ways that “normal” society actually marginalizes, represses, and oppresses not just human beings—the ultimate injustice of slavery—but, in lesser yet still devastating ways, aspects of interior potentials of human beings—the miniature injustices committed daily in the name of “conventional truth,” which is nothing but thinly disguised power.

It was also fascinating to read Foucault in light of his deep and lifelong interest in mystical states, and then read his American “interpreters,” who made virtually no mention of any of this. (I constantly had a déjà vu experience, similar to the one I had about Gustav Fechner, another profound theorist whose deeply transcendental roots have been expunged from college textbooks.) The green-meme postmodernists, driven by new left agendas, ended up marginalizing, ignoring, or actively repressing some of the absolutely crucial components of Foucault and his work, thus inadvertently displaying exactly the exclusionary and rarefaction rules investigated by Foucault; and they presented their results as “pluralistic diversity” when it was, Foucault would say, largely power. As Foucault would point out, their discursive networks had exclusionary rules that screened out any discussion of transcendence from the official, legitimate, and legally sanctioned realms of discourse. This marginalization of Foucault is something Foucault himself would definitely wish to emancipate us from.

Emancipatory interests have never been far from structuralism in its many forms. Emancipation: to be Free of limitation by finding a greater Fullness. Shamans could offer a greater Freedom in a greater Fullness, as likewise could the great saints and sages of the traditional or axial period. None of this depended upon the existence of pregiven higher levels, only the emergence of levels higher than those presently existing. Anytime that any

pioneer pushes into higher, wider, deeper domains and returns to tell us about it, they are in effect using structuralism, or third-person descriptions of first-person realities. And anytime that we believe that we have a higher, wider, deeper, freer, or fuller view of the world, we are using structuralism to tell others about it, and encourage their own **emancipation** by a **transformation** of their own **consciousness**, so that they are not merely translating third-person descriptions but are immersed in first-person realities, finding thereby a greater Freedom and a greater Fullness (in the I, we, and it domains).

(It amounts to the same thing to say that, just as structuralism is our only access to interior holism, it is our main call to interior emancipation, in that greater Freedom and Fullness always amount to the discovery of ever-greater wholeness....)

All of the great structuralists or interior holists—premodern to modern to postmodern—are testaments to the richness and vitality—and emancipatory power—of the zone #2 approaches that can be brought forth by our own indigenous perspectives. And anytime we are involved in the call to emancipation, we are involved in the noble goals and ideals supported by structuralism in its many guises.

Part IV. Conclusions of Adequate Structuralism

Overview

Although structuralism is only part of an integral methodological pluralism, it is nonetheless clearly an important part, at least on a par with phenomenology, hermeneutics, and systems theory, but elevated to a special importance by virtue of its emancipatory interests and holistic capacities.

Its paradigms and social practices continue to energize the important work of researchers such as Howard Gardner, Carol Gilligan, Juan Pascual-Leone, Susann Cook-Greuter, Michael Commons, Francis Richards, Jenny Wade, Kurt Fischer, Don Beck, Patricia

Notes

¹ Thus, phenomenologists who claim that consciousness is always intentional (or always a consciousness of something), are still caught in a monological prejudice that abstract subjects perceive abstracted objects. They are “half-way” right, so to speak, which is that all manifest consciousness is always consciousness of. But that is still a low-order abstraction mistaken for the reality of the situation, which is that a first person is always already in a series of relationships with other first, second, and third persons, and awareness, consciousness, and feelings arise within those networks, not outside of them.

² To be more specific, we have to use an expanded form of the integral calculus. To summarize the essentials: we have been using a two-term expression, such as **1p x 1p** (zone #1) or **3p x 1p** (zone #2), to represent the zones, but a three-term expression gives more of what is actually involved (see Excerpt D, Appendix B, “An Integral Mathematics of Primordial Perspectives”). Thus:

Zone #1 is **1p x 1-p x 1p**, which means a first person takes a first-person approach to first person realities (as with phenomenology or hermeneutics). Zone #2 is **1p x 3-p x 1p**,

which means a first person takes a third-person or objective approach to first person realities (as with structuralism). Zone #3 is **3p x 1-p x 3p**, which means a third person takes a first-person or inside view of third person realities (as with Maturana and Varela's autopoiesis). Zone #4 is **3p x 3-p x 3p**, which means a third person takes a third-person approach to third person realities (as with systems theory). We sometimes summarize these as, respectively, **1 x 1 x 1**, **1 x 3 x 1**, **3 x 1 x 3**, and **3 x 3 x 3**.

These are explored in more detail in the next excerpt, using a four-term expression in both singular and plural, as well as second persons; e.g., $1p(1p) \times 1p(3-p*pl) \times 1p(1-p) \times 2p(1/p)$, which means my first person has a objective view (i.e., as seen by a community of third-person plural) of your interior as seen from within. See [Excerpt E](#), Appendix, "An Integral Mathematics of Primordial Perspectives (part 2)."

³ This does not mean that "abstractions" are less real than sensations; by any meaningful definition, they are usually more real. They are a higher level of experience (in the continuum sensory experience, mental experience, spiritual experience). The dichotomy "experience vs. thought" (as if experience is direct, thought indirect) is a dualistic nightmare, and privileges sensory experience over mental experience, a regressive move. Unfortunately, Varela shares the standard phenomenological prejudice that thinking is a move away from immediateness, whereas it is simply a higher wave of immediateness. This higher wave can be used to represent other realities, but that does not make it less real, simply more sophisticated. Idealism in general denies the split between thought and experience, claiming that both are experiences of consciousness; in this regard, I agree entirely. See *One Taste*, Sept. 10 entry; also chap. 2 of *Eye to Eye*, CW3.

⁴ Needless to say, this phenomenology, which we are simplistically representing as $1p \times 1p$, can in fact get quite complicated, for within my own I-space there is an I-I, a proximate-I, an I/me, a distal-me, and a mine (among numerous others). These can all be indicated with a more sophisticated integral calculus, using not just two terms ($1p \times 1p$) but three or four. For

example, **1p(1p) x 1p(3-p) x 1p(1-p x 1/p)**, which means my first person has a third-person view of my first person's interior (stop), which is an objective or third-person view of my own interiors. These are explored in Excerpt E, Appendix, "An Integral Mathematics of Primordial Perspectives (part 2)." For this present Excerpt, the simple two-term expressions (e.g., 1p x 1p, 3p x 1p, etc.) will be used to convey the general ideas.

⁵ Notice I use "behavior" of an "interior" holon. The word "behavior," which classically refers to the UR, is the "objective" or third-person component of structuralism, the "outside" part of the "outside-interior" approach. We will explore this further in Integral Semiotics, Excerpt E.

⁶ See note 2.

⁷ The probability wave in this case is the *internal* agency or structure of that *interior* holon—i.e., the probability wave here is synonymous with the internality of the agency, where "internality" means the rules, patterns, or regularities of those subholons following the agency or structure of the dominant monad of the individual holon or the regnant nexus of the cultural holon. To describe the holon's agency or structure is simply to describe a probability space whose definitions are those ascribed to the structure—i.e., the probability space is the phenomenological space in which subholons that are internal to the interior holon arise.

⁸ This can technically be stated more accurately as a first-person study of the third-person dimensions of second-person interior realities (where "second person" is as we defined it technically: a third person that can be, or is, within a first-person plural space). Thus, structuralism is a type of **1p x 3-p x 2p**. (See notes 2, 4). Even more specifically, we would have **1p(1p) x 1p(3-p) x 2p(1-p x 1/p)**, which means my first person has a third-person or objective approach to your second person's interior (i.e., your first-person experience of your first person). See Excerpt E, Appendix, "An Integral Mathematics of Primordial Perspectives (part 2)."

⁹ In terms of an integral calculus of indigenous perspectives, structuralism is essentially a “third-person of first-person” (**3p x 1p**), as opposed to behaviorism and systems theory, which are a “third-person of third-person” (**3p x 3p**, singular and plural, respectively). Phenomenology and hermeneutics are essentially a first-person of first-person (**1p x 1p**, singular and plural, respectively). Although hermeneutics includes the exchange of third-person signs and outside tokens of interiors, successfully it results in either a direct or reconstructed shared-insides-interior, or “we” (first-person plural). This is the feel of the holon *from within* an “I” or “we” (first-person singular or first-person plural). See notes 2 and 8 for more details.

¹⁰ Hermeneutics is the study of those *interior* “we’s” from the *inside* of those “we’s” (1p x 1p); structuralism is the study of those *interior* “we’s” from the *outside* of those “we’s” (3p x 1p); systems theory (and ecology) is the study of their *exteriors* from *without* (3p x 3p). We are also calling those a first-person of first person (1p x 1p, inside-interior), a third-person of first person (3p x 1p, outside-interior), and a third-person of third person (3p x 3p, outside-exterior), respectively. Is there a study of the third-person *exteriors* from *within*, not without? Yes, and we have already introduced it: it is autopoiesis, or “biological phenomenology,” which attempts to describe the “view from inside the organism” (in a first-person-like perspective) but does so only in third-person terms such as “autopoietic structures” (which gives us the inside view of the exteriors, or simply the inside-exterior, 1p x 3p). See endnotes 2 and 8 for more details.

¹¹ To put it in technical terms, structuralism is the study of the *outside* and *exterior* of a holon in an attempt to discern the *interior* patterns or structures driving the holon’s behavior, and it essentially stops at an *outside* description or definition of the structure (or *internality* codes) of those *interior* holons driving the behavior.

All of those words—interior, exterior, outside, internal—are used in their technical sense. As we have seen, “outside” and “exterior” are not the same thing—“exterior” always

means Right-Hand or “physical,” or appearing in the sensorimotor world; “outside” means the outside of a holon in any of the four quadrants; in this case, “outside” means the outside of an interior holon: an I or a we/thou studied in a third-person or outside fashion; and “exterior” means its behavioral component in the sensorimotor world (such as my verbal behavior—the physical words I speak—as I talk to you about our interiors). “Internal” means the internality code of, in this case, the interior holon, or the rules and patterns followed by holons that are constitutive of—i.e., internal to—the “I” or “we.” Structuralism is the study of a holon’s outside/exterior landscape in an attempt to discern the structure of its internal/interior landscape: *but not its “inside” landscape*—“inside” a holon is *anything* inside the boundary of the compound individual or the compound network, whether it is an essential part of that holon or not (e.g., the invading parasite is inside the cell but not internal to the cell)—and structuralism is interested specifically in what is interior and internal, *not* what is inside—i.e., it is interested in the internality codes, agency, or structures of interior (subjective or intersubjective) holons as they express themselves in observable behavior. For example, structuralism wants to know the rules of chess, it does not want to know who is playing chess today—it wants to know what is internal to the game, not who is in the game—the structure of chess, not its players: internal, not inside.

¹² This is important because structuralism (**3p x 1p**) is, so to speak, the study of the interior landscape (the look of a feeling), whereas systems theory (**3p x 3p**) is the study of the exterior landscape (the look of a system). The “study of” or the “looking at” part is essentially similar in both (namely, a third-person, objective, or 3-p approach, which is why the first term in both is “**3p**”), but the landscape—the “studied” or the “looked at” part—is quite different (namely, an interior field of felt-meanings, **1p**, versus an exterior field of observed processes, **3p**). Put one last way, structuralism is a knowledge by description of a knowledge by acquaintance; systems theory is a knowledge by description of a knowledge by description—the look of a feeling versus the look of a look. As we will see in the text, the

positive gift of the third-person approaches (or the third-person component in any approach, which both structuralism and systems theory possess), is that they alone disclose holism or “big picture” views. Structuralism is interior holism, systems theory is exterior holism.

¹³ My italics. *Michael Foucault*, p. 57. Although I fully agree with the conclusions of that paragraph, Dreyfus and Rabinow are not, of course, using the words “internal,” “external,” or “exteriority” with precisely the same technical definitions I have given them. The same goes for the other “inside” and “outside” quotes given in this section; I agree with their general conclusions even if they use slightly different semantics. Most of the authorities, for example, use “inside,” “interior,” and “internal” as being essentially synonymous, whereas those are specific dimensions for AQAL. Nonetheless, the strong general agreement should be obvious.

¹⁴ *Michael Foucault*, p. 57, 51. My italics.

Within zone #2, the only major problem with Foucault is that he often confused emergent and repressed. That is, whenever Foucault found a truth that he felt was being ignored or denied, he tended to assume that it was not present because of some sort of oppression—some sort of exclusion and rarefication rules—whereas it often was not present simply because it had not yet emerged. This is the classic error of retro-Romanticism, the assumption that something important is missing because it is repressed: it was once present, but has been lost, and we need to recover it; whereas often, important truths are not present because they have not yet emerged in development: they were never present and then repressed, but they can become present with further growth. As Plotinus put it, sin is a not a “no,” but a “not yet.” This is the difference between “repressed goodness” and “growth to goodness” models (see *One Taste*).

The ways in which Foucault embraced retro-Romanticism, and then strongly repudiated it, are explored in *Boomeritis*. Basically, as critics have amply documented, this

confusion led him to initially read modernity as nothing but a nightmare, which is both factually and interpretively incorrect, as Foucault himself came to acknowledge.

¹⁵ *Michel Foucault*, p. 79, 85.

¹⁶ That this form of poststructuralism was essentially a narcissistic move is explored in *Boomeritis*.

¹⁷ What we see in all of this is indeed the history of postmodernism in a nutshell: starting from a zone #2 structuralism, in constant tension with zone #1 hermeneutics and phenomenology, then handling that tension not by integrating the two zones but by sliding into an incoherent social systems theory (zone #4) of deconstructive surfaces with no interiors at all—incoherent because it was supposed to account for intentionality and interiority, whereas it merely pronounced them nonexistent, exactly as systems theory does from the start, except that systems theory had the good sense not to claim that it was capturing interiors, whereas postmodernism claimed to elucidate them (but merely deconstructed and erased them). At the point that postmodernism began denying the existence of any form of interiority or depth—that is, any form of first-person realities—it had erased all “1p” components from any mode of inquiry (at which point books and articles began appearing showing that Derrida and systems theory were quite similar), and thus postmodernism had erased not only hermeneutics and phenomenology (1p x 1p) but also structuralism and neostructuralism in any form (3p x 1p)—because it has erased and deconstructed 1p in any form—and thus it handed the world a sloppy version of 3p x 3p, which could not account for even its own truth claims; and, in the academia where it now ruled, was forced to assert its power merely by threat: postmodern pluralism had come to exemplify the power-over knowledge that it had begun its history by so nobly criticizing.

AQAL metatheory suggests that one of the main reasons for this is that typical postmodern poststructuralism was driven by the pluralistic-relativistic probability wave (e.g., the green meme), and thus moved beneath the cognitive currents of second tier, which would

have allowed it to develop integral methodologies tying all of these important moments together. Foucault, almost alone, had always been driven by yellow cognition, and thus he alone of the major postmodernists agitated toward integral formulations, as explained in the main text.

¹⁸ *Michel Foucault*, p. xii. See SES, endnote 12 for chap. 7, for further discussion of Foucault, part of which reads:

His early archaeology of *actual* existence was a neostructuralist reworking of the traditional structuralist's analysis of *possible* types of experience, but it still placed emphasis on the exterior surfaces and structures of discursive formations and the transformation rules (of rarefaction and exclusion) that individuated serious speech acts. This neostructuralism scorned any attempt to get at the interior meaning of the discursive formations (which is the ultimate exterior or monological move: you absolutely never have to talk to the bearers of the linguistic formation because you don't even care what their utterances mean; this is simply the endgame of structuralism taken to an absolutism: just the exteriors of the structures, with no hermeneutic touch or feeling, at which point it veers into systems theory). In his later and more balanced view, the discursive episteme was replaced by the *dispositif*, or overall context of social practices (encompassing, as it were, the episteme), whose meaning could still only be seen in the coherence (all structuralism is holistic), but whose "insides" also had to be hermeneutically entered. "This new method," comment Dreyfus and Rabinow, "combines a type of archaeological analysis which preserves the distancing effect of structuralism [the exterior, objectifying, 3p component], and an interpretive dimension which develops the hermeneutic insight that the investigator is always situated and must understand the meaning of his cultural practices from within them [the 1p component supplied by zone #1]."

¹⁹ If you do, you are taking a 3p stance to them and thus have just stepped into zone #2, or structuralism by any other name, an objective third-person description of interior first-

person realities. Meditative traditions access a type of structural phenomenology when they outline stages of meditative development. Indeed, that type of structuralism (or a third-person map of first-person meditative states and stages) is part of their power and usefulness (and their emancipatory interests, as explained in the main text).

But those meditative stages are brought forth by one specific paradigm—the lineage spiritual practice—and thus a particular meditative paradigm does not disclose numerous other developmental lines and their stages.

For the same reason, the traditions often excel in a certain line of development (cognitive, meditative, spiritual) but score very poorly on other lines (psychosexual, affective, musical, mathematical, social skills, interpersonal, etc.).

Because other lines and their levels are not well understood, neither is the phenomena of “levels and lines,” where a person can score quite high in some lines, medium in others, and low in still others. *All* progress is therefore judged according to the single developmental line enacted by the meditation paradigm. (This often has grave consequences.)

Likewise, the extremely important phenomenon of “states and stages” (in which states of consciousness are interpreted by different stages of development) is also not well grasped by any of the traditions.

Finally, the phenomenal meditative stages are essentially subjective, not so much intersubjective. Those meditative stages are the result of practitioners watching the interiors of an individual consciousness, not the interiors of a group. That is, they don’t watch the group itself over time; they watch individuals in the group over time. They don’t watch the cultural nexus-agency, only the individual agency. They do not watch interactive capacities or intersubjective capacities, and thus they do not dig into the intersubjective background. Those can only be spotted, not by following individuals over time, but the group patterns of behavior over time, something that no spiritual tradition did (or even suspected; this is a postmodern realization; i.e., cultural contexts molding perception). Moreover, since, in most

cases, everybody in a premodern tradition was of one culture, this made it all the harder for the traditions to spot cultural contexts.

The phenomenal stages in meditation (as offered by various traditions) are fairly simple: they are classes of enacted phenomena, classes that, paradigmatic experience in that tradition indicates, emerge in a generally sequential, stage-like, or wave-like fashion (according to the traditions themselves). But they are not the rules or patterns underlying the phenomena. Those patterns are spotted by a more sustained third-person approach to interior realities, an approach specialized in by the sophisticated forms of modern developmental psychology (whose major drawback was that their data faded out around centauric levels, and thus they did not, at first, study the higher stages and waves of development; but the stages they did access were elucidated in extraordinary detail based on both subjective and intersubjective assessments).

For all of the above reasons, you will find interior stages of meditative development such as those outlined by St. Teresa, the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, the ten Zen ox-herding pictures, Abhinavagupta, vipassana, the Sefirot, and so on (which is the stage structuralism of the premodern Great Chain); but you will not find interior stages such as those discovered by Jane Loevinger, Lawrence Kohlberg, Clare Graves, etc.

Integral Methodological Pluralism finds all of those worthy of inclusion in any integral model.

²⁰ What structuralists call “transformation” is what we would call “holistic translation.” Structuralists call the coherency codes of a structure “transformational” because all structures enact a phenomenological world by taking the chaotic, incoherent, “blooming buzzing confusion” of experience and transforming it into a coherent whole, a unified perception (which then appears to awareness to be pregiven, or simply “the way things are,” when “the way things are” is actually a construction of structures). AQAL metatheory agrees entirely with that assessment; but for AQAL, the word “transformation” usually applies to vertical

shifts in structures, not what a particular structure is doing, which is generally called “translation.” What structuralists are pointing out is that every translation is a miniature transformation, in that a structure is a higher-order pattern enacted upon lower-order perceptions. Still, for AQAL, that is more accurately called holistic translation, but this is essentially a semantic issue.

²¹ “Autopoietic” is the 3p descriptor; if its referent is within a model of the objective organism, that is the UR theory of Maturana and Varela (**3p x 1-p x 3p**); when the referent is interior feelings and awareness, that is UL structuralism proper of, for example, Carol Gilligan (**1p x 3-p x 1p**). See endnotes 2, 4, and 8.

“Autopoiesis” is not a term generally used by structuralists, but as the Piaget quote makes obvious, the meaning is essentially the same. Still, in most cases, I reserve “autopoiesis” for the RH approaches, where it originated. As for “transformational,” see endnote 20.

²² As for Piaget’s main cognitive stages (sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational): As developmental psychologists know, Piaget presented three main stages of cognitive development: sensorimotor, concrete operational (conop), and formal operational (formop). Preoperational is not itself a true stage, but the first phase of conop. It has become common, however, to refer to Piaget’s “four” main stages, which is fine as long as we know what we are doing.

Piaget’s stages are ones that I still use, in a very general way, but *only* for the cognitive line of development, and then only for the lower half or so of the spectrum of consciousness (beyond formal operational is centauric vision-logic or higher mind, then illumined mind, intuitive mind, overmind, supermind; see fig. 5). Piaget’s major misjudgment, most critics now agree, was attempting to subsume all developmental lines within the cognitive line alone, which simply does not allow for the empirical fact that different lines show sometimes pronounced differences in rate of development and dynamics

of unfolding (see *The Eye of Spirit*). But Piaget's brilliance in meticulously investigating—and theoretically formulating, within a Hegelian/Kantian scheme—the development of cognitive worldviews, moral sense, space and time construction, levels of self sense, and so on—all within a largely nonreductionistic, holistic, constructivist, developmental/evolutionary, self-organizing paradigm—was a monumental contribution.

²³ This is healthy or constructive postmodernism as opposed to the more common fragmented or deconstructive postmodernism. Both of them postulate that the world is not given but interpreted and constructed. The healthy postmodernist outlines the structures that human beings must possess in order to be able to construct their world, many of which must be universal if human beings universally construct their worlds. The unhealthy postmodernist also outlines a theoretical system of what must be universally present and necessary in order for knowledge to be constructed, contextual, and pluralistic, and this system, like that of structuralist, is said to be true for all people—i.e., it is said to be *universally* true that people interpret reality, that knowledge is contextual, that intersubjectivity molds all knowledge, and so on—but the pluralistic postmodernist claims that there are no universals and that universals are oppressive. In other words, both of them are presenting structures and claims that are said to be universal; one of them is open and honest about the claims, the other is not; or, at the least, appears deeply confused about the truth-status of the pluralism that is claimed to be universally binding on all peoples and all cultures. Basically this amounts to a type of transparent universalism versus hidden universalism, the latter being the core of boomeritis. For an editorial on this state of affairs, see [Sidebar E](#), “Participatory Samsara,” posted on this site.

²⁴ For AQAL, most of the deep features (or self-regulating codes) of holons (in all domains) are not given ahistorically but rather are laid down in the process of evolution and development itself (i.e. all present synchronic codes were laid down diachronically). However, once laid down as evolutionary memory, they tend to become fixed Kosmic habits

(or a priori structures) in their developmental domains, acting as teleonomic omega points for all future members of the class, which is why, in very general terms, ontogeny does recapitulate phylogeny. But even when a holon's deep features appear as a priori forms or Kosmic habits, nonetheless the surface features *continue to be socially molded, historically fashioned, and often culturally relative*. No part of a holon then—whether deep or surface—stands completely outside the molding hands of time and history and evolution (except, of course, for the Timeless itself).

²⁵ See boomeritis endnote 6 for some of the cross-cultural research on the universality of these stages.

²⁶ “Structure” in structuralism can refer to the structure of an individual psychological agency (UL) and/or the structure of a cultural nexus-agency (LL)—a subjective structure and/or an intersubjective structure—where the “structure” is the third-person descriptor of the probability patterns displayed by the first-person realities.

But precisely because a “structure” is simply a postulation that attempts to account for certain phenomena brought forth by the social practice of adequate structuralism, these structures can be legitimately described and defined in any number of ways, as long as those ways conform to the enacted data or phenomena themselves.

In fig. 2, “structuralism” is given for the outside of the individual interior, and “cultural anthropology” for the outside of the collective interiors. Structuralism can be, and is, used in both, but the complexities of collective holons render structuralism one of the many useful tools in cultural studies, whereas for the outsides of individual interiors over time, it has no successful rivals and thus is listed as the exemplar of zone #2 in first-person singular.

For AQAL metatheory, as we have seen, a “structure” is simply one way to conceive the regularities of behavior that arise in a given probability space. From the “description” of the behavior one attempts to “define” the structure or agency at work (i.e., one attempts to define the patterns or Kosmic habits that have built up over time wherever a particular holon

has appeared). The *habitualness* (or regularity) of the pattern constitutes the *internality* of that holon (i.e., its agency, regime, coherence code, regnant nexus, or governing pattern—the more habitual the holon, the tighter the pattern). The regime, coherency, code, or agency of the structure (the “deep” part of the structure) simply defines what is “internal” to that holon, and hence indicates the probability of finding a particular occasion within the holon’s boundary in the relation subholon to holon.

²⁷ The phenomenologist attempts to describe the phenomena or chess tokens as clearly as possible; the hermeneuticist gets to know the players themselves; the systems theorist looks at all of the players and the tokens as equivalent exteriors in a social system connected via information; and the structuralist attempts to discern the hidden, invisible, internal patterns (conscious or unconscious) that the sentient beings in the system might be following. These Kosmic habits are part of the holon’s karmic continuity—not “bad karma” but “good karma”—habits these sentient holons have settled into as the platforms for their own stability in the midst of the degradation, dissolution, and decomposition tugging at them in all four quadrants (which is another way to say that structures must tetra-evolve, as all holons do).

²⁸ Technically, a song is an *artifact* and as such cannot adequately be used as an example of an organism or *compound individual*; if we do so, we would have to say that the organism is a self-song: it is autopoietic. This is similar to saying that an organism is a system, which is acceptable but slightly misleading in that it is a system with a dominant monad, which is not what we usually mean by a system (and which is why “system” is mostly used for communal or collective, not individual, holons). There are similar problems with the metaphor of a song, which does not adequately apply to an organism or sentient holon, nor to a stream or line in a sentient being, but rather to an artifact of a sentient holon. Likewise, the interaction of those artifacts is a song sung by a choir, not a big organism. Gaia, for example, is not a big compound individual, nor a song sung by an individual, but a song sung by a chorus

or choir of all sentient beings. That choral song, alas, is being sung off key, it is out of harmony, due to one species singing off-key loudly.... (another story). Individual organisms sing songs; Gaia is a chorus/choir, not itself another song sung by a big critter.

There is, however, one sense in which interior developmental lines are indeed artifacts, namely, artifacts of the transcendental Self (e.g., koshas of the Atman). Still, that view introduces several complicating factors, in that artifacts of the self and artifacts of the Self involve relative and ultimate dimensions, respectively, which are apples and oranges in explanatory theory.

I will continue to refer to developmental lines or streams as songs, simply because the analogy is so useful, but only with all of those qualifications.

² These structures or patterns of being-in-the-world are holistic, self-regulating, and self-organizing, although they always exist in networks of mutual exchange with other structures (agency is always agency-in-communion); they are self-organizing, not self-sufficient.

Likewise, self-organizing does not mean ahistorical. Assuming that structures are ahistorical or merely synchronic was perhaps the biggest faux pas of the pioneering structuralists, an assumption rejected unanimously by adequate structuralists today—that is, unanimously rejected by the community or “we” of those within the social practice of adequate structuralism, or those inside the hermeneutic circle whose nexus-agency consists of the legitimated or paradigmatic exchanges of this mode of inquiry (a mode of inquiry that uses aspects of the third-person dimensions of being-in-the-world to illumine, enact, and disclose aspects of first-person dimensions of being-in-the-world), such that all structuralists today agree that “we reject the theoretical assumption of merely synchronic, and not also diachronic, structures.”

These self-organizing structures are not outside of history or culture; they themselves developed and evolved (i.e., tetra-evolved as Kosmic habits); and they may continue to evolve, but the whole point about structures is that they provide the stability components in